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SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND FUTURE HARM:
LESSONS FROM ASYLUM LAW
Shawn E. Fields*
Abstract
Sexual violence victims face unique and enduring safety risks
following an assault. The legal system’s gradual shift from solely
punishing offenders for past acts to protecting survivors from future harm
reflects a recognition of this fact. But so-called “sexual assault protection
order” statutes impose onerous “future harm” requirements – including
proof by clear and convincing evidence that another sexual assault is
imminent – that belies the realities of ongoing injury for victims and
creates barriers to protection similar to the criminal justice approach to
rape.
This Article suggests a different approach, one justified by a novel
analogy to the refugee protection paradigm. Asylum law prospectively
protects applicants upon a showing that they have a “well-founded fear”
of future persecution. Only the most severe forms of discrimination qualify
as “persecution.” But applicants who can prove they have suffered a
single act of past persecution enjoy a rebuttable presumption of future
harm. Both courts and Congress have recognized the propriety of this
presumption, given the “atrocity” of persecution and the permanent
scarring it causes to “the mind of a refugee.” The same logic applies to
sexual violence, long considered “the most heinous crime” short of
murder. By transplanting the evidentiary framework from asylum law to
sexual civil protection, this Article does two things unique in scholarly
literature: 1) provides the first comprehensive consideration and overhaul
of the sexual violence protection order regime, and 2) reconceptualizes
asylum as a form of prospective civil protection.
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INTRODUCTION
The violence of rape endures. The unique “humiliation, degradation, and terror”
caused by sexual assault does not end with the completion of the physical act.1
Mental and emotional anguish following such a traumatic intimate violation can last
a lifetime. Feelings of insecurity in the immediate aftermath of an attack often shortcircuit a survivor’s ability to begin the difficult process of recovery, especially if the
assailant continues to have contact with the victim.2 In short, the violence done to
sexual assault victims pervades, encompasses, and alters entire lives.3
1

See 42 PA. CONS. STAT § 62A02 (2015) (describing the Pennsylvania General
Assembly purpose for a newly-created sexual assault civil protection order); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 7.90.005 (West 2019) (providing a “legislative declaration” in support of
creating Washington’s Sexual Assault Protection Order); see also Susan Estrich, Rape, 95
YALE L.J. 1087, 1148 (1986) (cautioning against “obscuring the unique meaning and
understanding of the indignity and harm of ‘rape.’”); Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Drugs: A
Statutory Overview and Proposals for Reform, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 131, 187 (2002) (“[S]exual
autonomy or sexual integrity, the violation of which represents a unique, not readily
comparable, type of harm to the victim.”).
2
See NICOLA GAVEY, JUST SEX? THE CULTURAL SCAFFOLDING OF RAPE 128–41 (2d
ed. 2019) (describing the emotional toll of repeated interactions and pressures women face
in having sex through example of several forms of relationship with rape perpetrators);
PATRICIA EASTEAL & LOUISE MCORMOND-PLUMMER, REAL RAPE, REAL PAIN: HELP FOR
WOMEN SEXUALLY ASSAULTED BY MALE PARTNERS 8–15 (2006) (discussing the lasting
trauma of partner rape); EDNA B. FOA & BARBARA OLASOV ROTHBAUM, TREATING THE
TRAUMA OF RAPE COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL THERAPY FOR PTSD 16–29 (David H. Barlow
ed., 2001) (describing several forms of disorder and mental health issues suffered among
rape victims, including a high incidence of PTSD); Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and
Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663, 695 (1999) (postulating that, in the absence of prosecution for
acquaintance rape, many victims simply want their attacker to “know that what [they] did
was wrong” (quoting Andrea parrot, Recommendations for College Policies and Procedures
to Deal with Acquaintance Rape, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME 369 (Andrea
Parrot & Laurie Bechofer eds., 1991))); Leonore M. J. Simon, Sex Offender Legislation and
the Antitherapeutic Effects on Victims, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 485, 526 (1999) (“Only by treating
acquaintance sex offenses as seriously as stranger cases can these victims begin the healing
process.”).
3
I use the terms “rape” and “sexual assault” interchangeably. But I also use, and prefer,
the term “sexual violence,” which not only encompasses both rape and sexual assault but
draws attention to the violent nature of these physical violations of the person, even where
force is absent. This preference is reflected in the title of the Article. I also use the terms
“victim” and “survivor” interchangeably, though in general I follow the mainstream
approach adopted by the sexual assault advocacy community and use the word “‘victim’
when referring to someone who has recently been affected by sexual violence,” and
“‘survivor’ to refer to someone who has gone through the recovery process, or when
discussing the short- and long-term consequences of sexual violence.” Key Terms and
Phrases, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/articles/key-terms-and-phrases [https://perma.cc/TC
47-6NK3] (last visited Aug. 12, 2019).
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Of course, similar statements can be made about many traumatic episodes,
especially violent criminal acts. But psychologists, scholars, and legislatures all
agree that rape is a unique atrocity, an affront to a victim’s very personhood in a way
different from any other physical violation.4 Moreover, this unique future harm
suffered by sexual violence victims is compounded in two important ways.
First, a substantial majority of these victims know and must continue to interact
with their assailants, either at school, work, or home.5 The #MeToo movement has
refocused attention on this epidemic of acquaintance rape and sexual assault,6
illuminating for many what survivor advocates have long known: that sexual
violence is often committed by a close friend or acquaintance and not a “stranger in
the bushes.”7 But while this movement has created a platform for survivors to come
forward with painful stories years or even decades later, relatively little attention has
been paid to recent survivors who face imminent and ongoing safety concerns from
attackers with whom they must have future contact.

4

See infra notes 107, 156–159 and accompanying text. Sexual violence
disproportionately affects women, and throughout the Article I refer either to women or more
generally to victims/survivors. See also MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., THE NATIONAL INTIMATE
PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 1 (2011) (suggesting
that nearly one in five women have been raped at some point; for men, the figure is one in
seventy-one). I am keenly aware, however, that sexual violence affects both men and women.
My scholarship is informed by my experience surviving an acquaintance rape from a close
college friend. Afraid of facing the “men can’t be raped” trope, I never spoke up. Thankfully,
survivors eventually find their voice in different ways; my scholarship is my voice.
5
See ILLINOIS COALITION AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT, ACQUAINTANCE RAPE,
http://www.icasa.org/docs/aquaintancerape.pdf [perma.cc/VP5R-HXNK] (last visited Aug.
12, 2019) (“More than 70% of rape victims knew their attackers . . . . In a survey of more
than 6,000 students at 32 colleges and universities in the U.S., it was found that . . . 84% of
the rape victims knew their attacker . . . .”).
6
See Jamie R. Abrams, The #MeToo Movement: An Invitation for Feminist Critique of
Rape Crisis Framing, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 749, 759 (2018) (observing that “#MeToo” and
related movements have begun to change “[p]ublic perception [that] tended to trivialize
acquaintance rape as more private, less serious, and less scary, despite emerging data that it
was ‘more common’ and ‘just as traumatic’” as stranger rape); History & Vision, ME TOO,
https://metoomvmt.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/U73J-Q26M] (last visited Aug. 26, 2019)
(“The ‘me too’ movement was founded in 2006 to help survivors of sexual violence . . . find
pathways to healing. . . . In less than six months, because of the viral #metoo hashtag, a vital
conversation about sexual violence has been thrust into the national dialogue.”).
7
Abrams, supra note 6, at 775 (“It is much less likely that a stranger will perpetrate
sexual crimes against women on campus; strangers committed 34% of reported sexual
battery incidents and 9% of rapes.”); Shawn E. Fields, Debunking the Stranger-in-the-Bushes
Myth: The Case for Sexual Assault Protection Orders, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 429, 433 (2017)
(“Approximately three-quarters of all sexual assaults are committed by close acquaintances
of the victims . . . .”).
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Second, victims seeking traditional legal recourse after an attack often
experience further harm and trauma instead of healing and justice.8 The criminal
justice system, in particular, provides cold comfort for these survivors. In a society
where rape myth tropes abound, victims rarely interact with officers who “start by
believing.”9 In a prosecutor-centric system obsessed with conviction rates, far too
few compelling cases of criminal rape and sexual assault ever see a courtroom.10
And in a punitive system where the victim is reduced to a “complaining witness”
with no meaningful role in the trial, virtually no one works towards a victim-centered
solution aimed at prospective protection and healing.11

8

Hannah Giorgis, Many women of color don’t go to the police after sexual assault for
a reason, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2015/mar/25/women-of-color-police-sexual-assault-racist-criminal-justice [https://perma.cc
/GT2M-RTVQ] (“If we report our assaults to the police, we risk being retraumatized . . . by
the violence of the criminal justice system itself, which treats rape victims like suspects.”).
9
See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility
Discount, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 33 (2017) (“The typical law enforcement investigation is
guilt-presumptive (and potentially problematic for that reason). In sexual assault cases, this
presumption is flipped.”); Lisa Avalos, Prosecuting Rape Victims While Rapists Run Free:
The Consequences of Police Failure to Investigate Sex Crimes in Britain and the United
States, 23 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 62–63 (2016) (reviewing structural reasons why police
investigations of rape often are not taken seriously and noting that, along with other
organizations, “the Start by Believing Campaign . . . offer[s] more detailed guidance on
specific approaches police can take to strengthen rape investigation and ensure officer
accountability.”); Becky Farley, A Perpetrator’s Paradise: Outdated Sexual Assault Statutes
Provide Minimal Protection to Survivors Who Are Victimized in Common Sexual Assault
Scenarios, 17 WYO. L. REV. 315, 316 (2017) (summarizing common victim-blaming
attitudes facing sexual assault survivors in the criminal justice system); It’s Time to Start by
Believing, END VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN INTERNATIONAL, https://www.evawintl.org/
images/uploads/General/SBB%20Brochure%202018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3J72-R2XR]
(last visited Feb. 11, 2019).
10
Fields, supra note 7, at 433–34 (“[D]istrict attorneys choose to prosecute fewer than
one in five of [sexual assault] arrests . . . .”); Estrich, supra note 1, at 1161–62 (exposing
prosecutor “screening” mechanisms for comparatively weaker rape cases, observing that
“[p]rosecution and conviction rates are highest when force and resistance are greatest, when
the rape is corroborated, when no prior relationship exists between victim and defendant, and
when the initial contact between the two is involuntary.”); see also Yxta Maya Murray, Rape
Trauma, the State, and the Art of Tracey Emin, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1631, 1646 n.181 (2012)
(examining claim that “low convictions rates” for rape lead to “vicious circles” of failure to
prosecute and failure to report (citing Jennifer Temkin, “And Always Keep A-Hold of Nurse,
for Fear of Finding Something Worse”: Challenging Rape Myths in the Courtrooms, 13 NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 710, 713 (2010))).
11
Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the
Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 27 n.136
(1999) (noting the minimizing effect of the criminal trial to the needs of rape victims,
particularly when “[t]he victim’s role is limited to that of a ‘complaining witness’”).
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An increasing number of jurisdictions, recognizing the uniquely private nature
of sexual violence and the failures of the criminal justice to prosecute this “most
heinous crime,”12 have crafted civil restraining orders designed specifically for
victims of sexual assault.13 These sexual assault protection orders (“SAPOs”) are a
recent addition to the legal landscape. In 2000, only California and North Dakota
provided civil protection mechanisms for sexual violence survivors.14 By 2015, that
number had grown to twenty-eight.15 The emergence of these new protection orders
has been uneven, with significant variance among states in terms of scope,
procedure, evidentiary burdens, and remedies.16
Some common features, however, predominate. SAPOs operate much like
more well-known domestic violence restraining orders by allowing victims to seek
immediate ex parte relief from their abusers, apply for permanent “stay away” relief
in an expeditious and flexible evidentiary hearing, and pursue other victim-centered
prospective and compensatory relief to protect their safety and healing process.17
Legal regimes addressing the future harms of sexual violence provides a helpful
start. But a majority of these protection order statutes impose unnecessarily
burdensome evidentiary requirements that reflect a continued ignorance of the
realities of sexual assault victimization.18 In particular, most SAPOs and analogous
restraining order mechanisms require survivors to prove not only that a sexual
assault occurred, but that the perpetrator is likely to commit another sexual assault
or other act of violence in the near future.19 Many states require victims to prove that
12
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 22/102 (2004) (“Sexual assault is the most heinous crime
against another person short of murder. Sexual assault inflicts humiliation, degradation, and
terror on victims.”).
13
See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, SEXUAL ASSAULT
CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS (CPOS) BY STATE (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/domestic_violence1/Charts/SA%20CPO%20Final%202015.authch
eckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/YAD7-WUGG] [hereinafter ABA, DOMESTIC & SEXUAL
VIOLENCE] (summarizing the twenty-eight states offering some form of civil protection relief
to victims of sexual assault).
14
See infra Appendix Table 1 (summarizing development of SAPOs by year).
15
See id.
16
See infra notes 98–121 and accompanying text.
17
See Hayley Jodoin, Closing the Loophole in Massachusetts Protection Order
Legislation to Provide Greater Security for Victims of Sexual Assault: Has Massachusetts
General Laws Chapter 258E Closed it Enough, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 102,
116–22 (2012) (analogizing the purpose and function of SAPOs to domestic violence
restraining orders).
18
See infra Appendix Table 2 (noting that nearly half of all states with statutes offering
civil protection for sexual assault victims require proof that another attack is imminent by at
least a preponderance of the evidence).
19
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-103 (2018) (requiring to show “that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that a minor child is in danger in the reasonably foreseeable
future of being the victim of an unlawful sexual offense”); FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (2019)
(requiring to show that “[p]etitioner genuinely fears repeat violence by the respondent”);

182

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

their assailants are more likely than not to assault them again,20 and California and
Wyoming require proof by clear and convincing evidence that another sexual assault
is imminent.21
In most cases of acquaintance rape, such an onerous and specific evidentiary
hurdle is virtually impossible to meet and threatens to render SAPO legislation as
ineffective as criminal adjudications.22 More fundamentally, requiring proof of a
specific type of future harm “ignores the reality faced by victims of sexual assault.”23
It fails to account for the harm suffered when victims are forced to be present with
their attackers.24 It also ignores significant evidence indicating that perpetrators can
and often do exercise control over sexual assault survivors through “non-violent”
intimidation and bullying, though few perpetrators telegraph this behavior in
advance. 25
This Article suggests an alternative evidentiary approach better aligned with
the future harms of sexual violence: a “rebuttable presumption of future harm”
standard. Restraining orders provide prospective relief, and thus should be premised
on some likelihood of future injury.26 For sexual violence victims, however, a
rebuttable presumption of future harm should exist once the victim has proven that

MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-102 (2019) (stating that a person may file a petition for an order
of protection if “the petitioner is in reasonable apprehension of bodily injury”). For a
complete list, see infra Appendix Table 2.
20
See infra Appendix Table 2.
21
Id.
22
See Military Law – Justiciability - Eastern District of Virginia Dismisses Suit Against
Government for Military Sexual Assaults, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2243, 2247 (2017) (observing
that a standard requiring a sexual assault victim “to assert facts that predict she will be
assaulted in the future” creates “a nearly impossible standard” (citation omitted)).
23
Fields, supra note 7, at 487 (“Following an assault, the mere mention or presence of
the attacker can cause immeasurable harm.” (citing JESSICA E. MINDLIN & LIANI JEAN HEH
REEVES, CTR. FOR LAW & PUB. POLICY ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES:
MEETING THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVIVORS 77 (2005),
https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/6469-rights-and-remedies-meeting-the-civil-legal-needs
[https://perma.cc/H9TK-8XRV])).
24
See Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in Rape Survivors, AM. ACAD. EXPERTS IN
TRAUMATIC STRESS, http://www.aaets.org/article178.htm [https://perma.cc/U2TJ-QGVB]
(last visited Aug. 22, 2019) (describing rape trauma syndrome, including the ability to be
triggered into a state of paralysis in the presence of one’s attacker).
25
See id.
26
See Rynearson v. Ferguson, 903 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he primary
purpose of [a restraining] order is to protect the petitioner, not punish the respondent.”);
Brian Kuhl, Long-Arm to Protect the Unarmed from Harm by the Armed: Why Wisconsin
Needs a New Statute to Ensure Its Residents Can Obtain Restraining Orders Against Foreign
Residents Who Threaten Them, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1041, 1054 (2012) (“The purpose of
restraining order statutes is to allow the state government to protect its threatened or abused
citizens by preventing future harm.”).
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a past sexual assault has in fact occurred. Such an approach would accord with the
very real and unique risks of re-traumatization facing rape and sexual assault
survivors.
For support, this Article draws a novel but compelling parallel to a seemingly
unrelated body of law: asylum law. Under United States and international law,
asylum seekers must demonstrate a “well-founded fear of [future] persecution” on
account of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a
particular social group.27 This standard is inherently prospective in that asylum
seekers must prove some genuine fear of future harm if returned to their home
country. But asylum law also provides asylum seekers with a rebuttable
presumption: if the applicant did, in fact, suffer a past qualifying act of persecution,
a rebuttable presumption exists that the applicant possesses a well-founded fear of
future persecution.28 The justification articulated for this rebuttable presumption
standard —that no one who “has suffered under atrocious forms of persecution”
should be forced to reengage with their attackers, given how such an experience
forever changes “the mind of the refugee”—applies with equal force for survivors
of the “heinous crime” of sexual violence.29
More broadly, this Article suggests a novel way to conceptualize asylum law:
as a form of protection order. It is precisely asylum law’s prospective, victimcentered focus that renders the analogy so apt. Both asylum law and civil protection
order statutes protect specifically defined, vulnerable groups of people. Both provide
prospective protection premised on a reasonable likelihood of future harm and
employ flexible procedures through which to establish this harm. And both offer
remedies tailored to the healing of the victim, not the punishment of the assailant.
There are limits to the analogy. Asylum cases arise from the actions of nonparty foreign governments over which immigration courts have no jurisdiction,
while restraining order hearings require the appearance of the alleged assailant and
carry the threat of sanction against respondents.30 And asylum seekers are,
27
See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6529,
189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter UN 1951 Convention]; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
28
See Tianhai Cui v. Whitaker, 749 F. App’x 642, 643 (9th Cir. 2019) (“A finding of
past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future
persecution.”).
29
In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 19 (BIA 1989) (creating rebuttable presumption
standard); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(ii) (2019) (codifying rebuttable presumption standard);
see also Nozadze v. Sessions, 740 F. App’x 476, 483 (6th Cir. 2018) (“In the absence of a
well-founded fear of future persecution, an applicant may nevertheless be eligible for a
discretionary grant of humanitarian asylum if he or she ‘has suffered under atrocious forms
of persecution.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Ben Hamida v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 734, 740
(6th Cir. 2007))).
30
Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2017) (“An [asylum]
applicant . . . has the burden of establishing that . . . the persecution was committed by the
government, or by forces that the government was unable or unwilling to control.” (citing
Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010))).
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presumably, already physically separated from their perpetrators while protection
order petitioners are applying for precisely that sort of separation. But while the
procedural process of these two regimes may be reversed, the overall protection
paradigm of each legal regime is sufficiently similar to merit examination.
Critics of this approach likely will decry the lack of protections afforded the
accused. In the Title IX context, the Trump administration and a growing chorus of
scholars warn of the dangers of “victim-led prosecutions” of sexual violence, calling
for a heightened clear and convincing evidence standard, right of appeal for the
accused but not the accuser, and other procedural hurdles.31 Analogizing civil sexual
violence adjudications to asylum proceedings may only further antagonize these
critics; after all, a grant of asylum neither carries with it the individualized sanction
nor the continuing stigma of a sexual assault protection order.32
These concerns merit discussion. But they also understate both the structural
societal hurdles sexual violence victims face through “credibility discounting,”33
victim shaming,34 and the unique future harms accompanying sexually violent acts.
31

See DEP’T OF EDUC. ISSUES NEW INTERIM GUIDANCE ON CAMPUS SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list
/ocr/letters/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf [https://perma.cc/ED9D-7VTH] [hereinafter 2017
Dear Colleague Letter] (issuing new guidance for Title IX sexual assault cases and rescinding
Obama-era guidance that “created a system that lacked basic elements of due process and
failed to ensure fundamental fairness”); Open Letter from Mike Adams et al., Stop Abusive
and Violent Environments, Regarding Inequitable Victim-Centered Practices (Feb. 7, 2018),
http://www.saveservices.org/wp-content/uploads/Victim-Centered-Practices-Open-LetterFINAL.docx.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NG3-UR6H] (providing an open letter signed by 140
law professors criticizing “the use of investigative ‘victim-centered’ practices that threaten
to subvert the objective collection and presentation of evidence in administrative, civil, and
criminal sexual assault proceedings [through] guilt-presuming methods.”); see also Tamara
Rice Lave, A Critical Look at How Top Colleges and Universities Are Adjudicating Sexual
Assault, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 377, 389–402 (2017) (surveying procedures in college sexual
assault hearings and contrasting guidance provided by the Obama and Trump
administrations).
32
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c) (2012).
33
See Tuerkheimer, supra note 9, at 3 (defining “credibility discounting” as “skepticism
of rape complaints [and] . . . the dismissal of women’s reports of sexual violation,” a
phenomenon that is “systemic” and “firmly lodged”).
34
See David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1234, 1262 (1997) (“Many rape scholars imply that leniency
in acquaintance rape cases has no parallels in other criminal cases . . . [because] victim
blaming defense are more often successful in acquaintance rape cases than any other criminal
case.”); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Slutwalking in the Shadow of the Law, 98 MINN. L. REV.
1453, 1461–62 (2014) (describing advocacy efforts to counter “‘slut shaming,’ victim
blaming, and a rape culture that excuses sexual violence perpetrated by non-strangers”);
Andrew Beaven, Rape girl “driven to suicide by her ordeal in court,” DAILY MAIL (Jan. 29,
2015), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-129105/Rape-girl-driven-suicide-ordealcourt.html [https://perma.cc/F8EK-GH2B] (describing case of Lindsay Armstrong, a teenage
rape victim who committed suicide after being embarrassed by defense counsel requiring her
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Concerns regarding the downstream effects to respondents in SAPO hearings –
including limits on school choice and housing or employment opportunities35 – can
be addressed by sealing court records and taking other measures to ensure the
privacy of all parties. Imposing insurmountable front-end hurdles to relief for sexual
violence victims is not the answer.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the history, purpose, and
function of SAPOs, with emphasis on the unique ongoing trauma of sexual violence
and the uneven statutory response to this trauma. Part II examines the existing
“future harm” legal framework in SAPOs, including the requirement of proof of
multiple past acts of violence and independent proof of likely “imminent” future
harm, often by a heightened burden. This section explores how this existing
framework misunderstands the enduring violence of sexual assault and threatens to
create unjustified barriers to entry for petitioners. Part III analogizes the underlying
purpose of SAPOs to the underlying purpose of asylum law and considers whether
a limited “framework borrowing” of asylum’s rebuttable presumption of future harm
and well-founded fear standards can point the way forward in SAPO legislation.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF SEXUAL ASSAULT PROTECTION ORDERS
Until very recently, sexual violence victims had little legal recourse outside a
broken criminal justice system. The proliferation in the last ten years of civil
protection relief for these victims merits consideration. This section describes the
normative and historical justifications for civil protection orders generally, how
sexual assault protection fit within that context, and how individual states have
approached SAPO legislation.
A. History and Purpose of Civil Protection Orders
The common law civil injunction has existed as an equitable remedy since at
least the fourteenth century.36 Today, civil litigants invoke a version of this
“quintessential equitable remedy”37—the preliminary injunction—in emergency
to hold up in court the thong underwear she wore the night she was raped and implying she
“deserved to be raped”).
35
See Courts, Not Campuses, Should Decide Sexual Assault Cases, INTELLIGENCE
SQUARED (Sep. 16, 2015), https://www.intelligencesquaredus.org/debates/courts-notcampuses-should-decide-sexual-assault-cases [https://perma.cc/GD6X-P9HR] (arguing that
campus sexual assault tribunals lack fairness and result in disproportionate outcomes); Janet
Halley, Trading the Megaphone for the Gavel in Title IX Enforcement, 128 HARV. L. REV.
F. 103, 106–08 (2015) (describing “overcorrection” of sexual assault adjudications
employing reduced procedural protections for the accused).
36
David W. Raack, A History of Injunctions in England Before 1700, 61 IND. L.J. 539,
555 (1985) (“Injunctions appeared in Chancery as early as the 1390s.”).
37
Id. at 539; see also H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Prospective Compensation in Lieu
of a Final Injunction in Patent and Copyright Cases, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1661, 1700 (2010)
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situations to prevent an alleged “imminent irreparable harm” from an opposing
party.38 The alleged harms justifying this preliminary relief can be as varied as
litigation itself: the destruction of an environmental habitat from a construction
project,39 disclosure of a trade secret,40 or a ban on immigration.41 Given the urgency
of many situations, litigants often request a temporary injunction (or temporary
restraining order) on a shortened briefing schedule while the parties conduct
discovery and prepare to do battle over the prospect of an order permanently
enjoining conduct.42 While courts can quickly grant temporary injunctions, the
elements and burden of proof required to receive them create a significant barrier to
most parties facing possible irreparable harm. 43 And as with any traditional civil
litigation, the expense needed to secure even a temporary order can be prohibitive.

(arguing that prospective compensation acts “[m]uch like an injunction—the quintessential
equitable remedy”); Eric A. White, Examining Presidential Power Through the Rubric of
Equity, 108 MICH. L. REV. 113, 124 n.69 (2009) (“The injunction is in many ways the
quintessential equitable remedy.” (citing John Leubsdorf, Preliminary Injunctions: In
Defense of the Merits, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (2007))); Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying
Monetary Restitution, 55 S.M.U. L. REV. 1577, 1614 (2002) (“The injunction is the
quintessential equitable remedy . . . .”).
38
Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 840 F.3d 1244, 1248 (11th Cir. 2016) (“A
preliminary injunction requires showing ‘imminent’ irreparable harm . . . . Indeed, the very
idea of a preliminary injunction is premised on the need for speedy and urgent action to
protect a plaintiff’s rights before a case can be resolved on its merits.”); Hynoski v. Columbia
County Redevelopment Authority, 485 F. App’x. 559, 563 (3d Cir. 2012) (providing that
“[t]he preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm,”
but affirming denial of injunction because “the appellants did not allege imminent irreparable
harm”).
39
D’Agnillo v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 965 F. Supp. 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (denying motion to preliminarily enjoin construction of subsidized housing project in
City of New Yonkers because the plaintiff “failed to demonstrate any present likelihood of
imminent irreparable harm to the environment”).
40
Gable-Leigh, Inc. v. North American Miss, No. CV01-01019MMM (SHxa), LEXIS
25614, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2001) (granting preliminary injunction to prevent imminent
disclosure of beauty pageant company trade secrets by former employee).
41
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (reversing grant of multiple
nationwide preliminary injunctions barring enforcement of a presidential proclamation
banning all immigration from certain countries because “plaintiffs have not shown that they
are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims”).
42
See Brocade Commc’ns. Sys., Inc. v. A10 Networks, Inc., No. C 10-3428 PSG.,
LEXIS 4834, *17–18 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2013) (discussing the “‘emergency relief’ requested
in a preliminary injunction”).
43
Id. at *17 (“[B]ecause of the ‘emergency relief’ of a preliminary injunction, the
standard for ‘irreparable harm’ is higher in that context than in the permanent injunction
setting.”).
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In contrast, “protection orders” have a much narrower function: to protect an
alleged victim of a violent crime from future harm at the hands of the accused.44
“Before the 1970s, protection orders were sought primarily by prosecutors in
connection with existing criminal cases.”45 These “criminal protection orders” were
traditionally granted as a matter of course in domestic violence cases, where the
victim and the assailant were likely to have significant future contact.46 While the
aim of criminal protection orders ostensibly is to protect the victim from future harm,
in practice, these orders often fail to accomplish this goal for three reasons. First, the
vast majority of domestic violence assaults never reached the courtroom, as
“American society viewed domestic violence as a trivial matter . . . best kept veiled
within the confines of the private home.”47 Second, the few cases that did merit
prosecution were controlled entirely by the state, and courts granted “protection”
orders without the involvement or consent of the victim, who may have had
compelling reasons not to seek an order.48 Third, these orders only required
assailants to “stay away” and did not grant more comprehensive financial,
emotional, and safety support needed by victims in crisis.49
44

Alanis-Alvarado v. Holder, 558 F.3d 833, 836 (9th Cir. 2009) (“‘[P]rotection order’
means any injunction issued for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts . . . .”
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) (2012))); Studer v. Studer, 2012-Ohio-2838, ¶ 19 (Ohio
App. 3d, June 25, 2012) (“The purpose of a civil protection order . . . is to provide the
petitioner or other household members with protection from . . . violence.”); State v.
Dejarlais, 944 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (“The purpose of a domestic violence
protection order is to reduce the abuser’s power over the victim.”).
45
Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order Coverage: A
Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 98 (2005) (“The only place where a victim
could obtain a civil order of protection was divorce court.”).
46
Id. at 116–17.
47
Melanie Kalmanson, Filling the Gap of Domestic Violence Protection: Returning
Human Rights to U.S. Victims, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1359, 1367 (2016) (describing the
history of the “chastisement” principle, wherein a husband was allowed to “command a
wife’s obedience, and subject her to corporal punishment . . . if she defied his authority”
(quoting Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2122–23 (1996))).
48
Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 17 (2006) (“Whereas the
civil protection order is sought voluntarily by the victim, the criminal protection order is
sought and issued by the state in the public interest.”); Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil
Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the
Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1546 n.358 (2008) (describing “criminal court’s
practice of entering a criminal protection order . . . regardless of the victim’s wishes” (citing
Suk, supra note 49, at 48–50)).
49
See Suk, supra note 48, at 8 (describing prosecutors’ use of criminal protection orders
“to command defendants to stay away from their spouses and homes on pain of arrest” as a
way to circumnavigate the guilt beyond a reasonable doubt standard); Christopher R. Frank,
Criminal Protection Orders in Domestic Violence Cases: Getting Rid of Rats with Snakes,
50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 919, 938–41 (1996) (summarizing remedies for state criminal protection
orders).
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Born out of “an effective challenge to [the patriarchal] regime” by “the
contemporary women’s rights movement,” states began crafting civil protection
orders for domestic abuse victims in the 1970s, in recognition both of the widespread
epidemic of gender-based family violence in the United States and the need to
provide agency to victims in a survivor-led process.50 While New York’s first-inthe-nation domestic violence restraining order (“DVRO”) statute was passed in
1962, the second such DVRO statute was not passed until 1976, in Pennsylvania.51
After that, however, change happened rapidly. By the time Congress passed the
Violence Against Women Act in 1994, creating a federal civil legal remedy for
gender-based violence and shining a national spotlight on the crisis of domestic
abuse,52 all fifty states and the District of Columbia had DVRO statutes.53
Many scholars have explored this history and development of DVRO
legislation before,54 but few have considered the broader protection order paradigm
this history created. At root, DVROs were developed to 1) address a widespread
humanitarian crisis;55 2) affecting a discrete and vulnerable population;56 3)
50

Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2171 (1996); see also Kalmanson, supra note 47, at 1366.
51
Smith, supra note 45, at 99–100.
52
See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 42 U.S.C. §§
13701–14040 (1994), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
53
Smith, supra note 45, at 99–100 (“Pennsylvania passed its Protection from Abuse
Act in 1976, which created an avenue for victims of domestic violence to obtain protection
orders outside the context of criminal court or civil divorce proceedings. Other states began
to follow suit. By 1994, all fifty states had adopted some form of domestic violence civil
protection order legislation.”).
54
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 45, at 100–04 (summarizing excellent legal scholarship
on history and development of domestic violence restraining order protections).
55
Linda L. Ammons, Discretionary Justice: A Legal and Policy Analysis of a
Governor’s Use of the Clemency Power in the Cases of Incarcerated Battered Women, 3 J.L.
& POL’Y 1, 5 (1994) (“[A] congressional report indicated that the most dangerous place in
the United States for a woman to be is in her home.”); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 891 (1992) (“[O]n an average day in the United States,
nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners.”); Martha F. Davis &
Susan J. Kraham, Protecting Women’s Welfare in the Face of Violence, 22 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1141, 1145 (1994) (describing the impact of the domestic violence “epidemic” on “poor
women” and noting “60% of women [in Washington State] on public assistance reported
sexual and physical abuse as adults, usually by a spouse or boyfriend”); In re White, No.
G036010, 2006 WL 1454769, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App., May 26, 2006) (“Allowing a domestic
violence victim to obtain a restraining order under a lower standard of proof is a rational way
of combating this epidemic.”).
56
See People v. Bogle, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 739, 7459 (Cal. Ct. App.1995) (construing the
term “cohabitant” in domestic violence restraining order legislation broadly “because
‘individuals are uniquely vulnerable in their domestic environment’” (quoting People v.
Siravo, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 354 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993))); People v. Marquez, H029431U,
2007 WL 3051722 (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 19, 2007) (“[T]he purpose of section [California’s
DVRO statute] is to protect persons in their domestic environment where they are ‘uniquely
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suffering from profound physical, mental, or emotional violence; 4) that is likely to
continue without intervention; and 5) that which existing legal structures have failed
to prevent; by 6) affording the victim agency to direct the course of protection.57
This protection order paradigm helps explain the proliferation of similar protection
order legislation aimed at curbing other narrowly-defined epidemic abuses directed
at vulnerable populations, including the elderly, members of immigrant
communities, members of tribal communities, LGBTQIA community members, and
victims of sexual violence.58
Functionally, civil protection orders statutes address the urgency of preventing
grave future harm by providing flexible and immediate procedural benefits to
victims not readily available in the criminal context alone. Most civil protection
order statutes allow victims to obtain a temporary order ex parte, requiring the
alleged assailant to stay away for up to three weeks while the court sets a hearing
for a permanent protection order hearing.59 That hearing employs more flexible
evidentiary standards than criminal adjudications allow, in recognition of the fact
that “[a] victim may not have the evidence necessary to sustain criminal charges, but
may have evidence to support a finding that she is in danger, or that a past crime has

vulnerable’ because of their relationship with the perpetrator.” (citing Bogle, 48 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 745)). This vulnerability is heightened when among intersectional groups. See Joshua
B. Gurney, An “SDVCJ Fix”—Paths Forward in Tribal Domestic Violence Jurisdiction, 70
HASTINGS L.J. 887, 892 (2019) (“Colonization and historical trauma experienced by Indian
communities also played a role in making Indian women uniquely vulnerable to domestic
violence.”); Kae Greenberg, Still Hidden in the Closet: Trans Women and Domestic
Violence, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 198, 221–23 (2012) (describing how legal and
social rules make trans women particularly vulnerable to domestic violence); Natalie Nanasi,
The U Visa’s Failed Promise for Survivors of Domestic Violence, 29 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
273, 283 (2018) (“[I]mmigrant women are uniquely vulnerable to intra-family violence and
are more likely to face domestic abuse than members of the general population.”).
57
See Leonore M.J. Simon, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach to the Legal
Processing of Domestic Violence Cases, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y, & L. 43, 49 n.31 (1995)
(summarizing studies demonstrating the recidivist nature of spousal batterers and the failure
of the criminal justice system to “significantly reduce recidivism”); see also id. at 44 (“The
legal response to domestic violence cases has been so weak that offenders seem to walk away
from a legal encounter believing that they can batter their intimate partner or ex-partner with
impunity.”); Smith, supra note 45, at 119 (“[C]ivil protection orders empower the victim.
They can have a positive effect on the emotional well-being of victims by giving them a
choice of remedies.”).
58
See generally Selected State Statutes, Plain-language Legal Information for Victims
of Abuse, NATIONAL NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://www.womenslaw.org/
laws/statutes [https://perma.cc/U67Z-LSGG] (last visited Aug. 12, 2019) (summarizing
various protection orders by state).
59
Smith, supra note 45, at 99–102; see also Carolyn N. Ko, Civil Restraining Orders
for Domestic Violence: The Unresloved Question of “Efficacy,” 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
361, 365 (2002).
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occurred, under a lower burden of proof.”60 These civil hearings also typically
“provide protection more quickly than criminal orders of protection,” and authorize
a much broader range of victim-centered relief than the limited “stay away” nature
of a criminal protection order.61
More fundamentally, “civil protection orders empower the victim. . . . [T]he
victim, rather than the state, has control over what happens to her.”62 “Studies show
that this type of empowerment affects a victim’s sense of well-being,” and allows
the victim to determine when—and whether—a protection order makes sense for
herself and her family.63 “In this way, civil protection orders may ‘work’ more
effectively than criminal orders of protection because the victim . . . chooses when
to file and directs the strategy of obtaining the order, in contrast to the criminal
system.”64
B. History and Purpose of Sexual Assault Protection Orders
Alongside efforts to pass DVRO legislation, the women’s rights movement
sought changes “in the law [regarding] gender equality in sex and sexual relations.”65
These efforts focused almost entirely on “[t]he treatment of crimes specifically
targeting women, [like] sexual assault,” and initially focused on “revisions in
antiquated and gender-biased rape statutes.”66 One of the most significant reforms
to rape laws was the redefinition of “consent,” specifically the “[e]limination of
force as a statutory element of rape.”67 Laws defining sexual assault as “forced
sexual penetration that causes injury”68 ignored the thousands of nonconsensual

60

Smith, supra note 45, at 119.
Id.
62
Id. at 120–21.
63
Id. at 121; see also Susan Keilitz et al., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Protection Orders:
The Benefits and Limitations for Victims of Domestic Violence, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
FROM A PRIVATE MATTER TO A FEDERAL OFFENSE: THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM’S RESPONSE
TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 3, 49 (Patricia G. Barnes ed., 1988).
64
Smith, supra note 45, at 122; see also Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40
UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1420–21 (1993) (discussing the importance of empowering victims of
domestic violence throughout the legal process and beyond).
65
Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next Thirty
Years of Rape Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 467, 467 (2005).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 484; see also STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF
INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 99–113 (1998) (cataloguing the American criminal
system’s failure to punish non-physical interference with sexual autonomy).
68
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b (2019) (effective Mar. 4, 2014) (defining
several situations in which sexual assault can occur, such as forced or coerced sexual
penetration that causes injury).
61
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sexual encounters made possible through duress, coercion, intoxication, or
unconsciousness.69
The separation of force and consent as independent elements of rape, and
eliminating the need to prove force for certain categories of criminal rape and sexual
assault reflected a significant shift in the move towards sexual equality. It also
accorded with the realities of rape and sexual assault in the United States. Over
seventy-five percent of all sexual assaults are committed by acquaintances of the
victim, not by a “stranger in the bushes” leaping out to commit a violent rape.70 And
a majority of these acquaintance rapes are committed through non-violent coercive
tactics, such as intimidation and threats, forced intoxication, or—as the #MeToo
Movement has so abundantly demonstrated—exploitation of power and control.71
But despite these reforms, “society still expects rape to be a horrifically violent
crime.”72 In the criminal justice system, “law enforcement personnel, judges, and
potential jurors . . . are ambivalent about placing criminal sanctions on ‘non-violent’
sexual assault or, for that matter, anything short of violent penetration that results in
physical injuries.”73 This ambivalence, of course, disproportionately affects
acquaintance rape victims. “Although treated in rape law as an independent element,
force often acts as a proxy for awareness of nonconsent,” with the absence of one
negating the presence of the other. 74 These problems are as endemic to the nature of
criminal prosecutions themselves as they are to societal attitudes about “nontraditional rapes.”75 “Even when nonconsent is the defining criterion of rape, it will
69
See SCHULHOFER, supra note 67, at 100–12 (articulating need to criminalize sex
procured by threats, abuse of trust, exploitation of psychological or physical incapacity,
intoxication, or exploitation of psychological or economic power or authority).
70
Fields, supra note 7, at 432–33.
71
Vera Baird, Sexual abuse is about power – and the powerful shouldn’t be protected,
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/29/
sexual-abuse-power-max-clifford-sexual-assault-anonymity
[https://perma.cc/A7V8QQ7E] (“The key to abuse is power – of the abuser over the abused. Although sexual assault
occurs across society, men of influence or standing carrying an extra sparkle of fame can be
especially prey to a sense of entitlement. Their victims often do not understand that they are
being groomed.”).
72
Seidman & Vickers, supra note 65, at 484. (“[S]ocietal attitudes . . . have not kept
pace with statutory reform.”); id. at 468.
73
Id. at 473; see also Fields, supra note 7, at 443 (“When victims don’t conform to
idealized versions of what a rape victim should look and act like, untrained and inexperienced
officers, like most people, are highly likely to doubt them.”).
74
Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes of Indifference, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 105, 164 (1996);
See also Robin Charlow, Bad Acts in Search of a Mens Rea: Anatomy of a Rape, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 275 n.49 (2002) (“Typically, the elements of nonconsent and force
merge.” (quoting JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 33.04[B][1][a]
(1987))).
75
See Charlow, supra note 74, at 289 (describing unclear rape statutes that emphasize
force to such a degree that “consent does not appear to be an element”); Alan Wertheimer,
What Is Consent? And Is It Important?, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 557, 558–59 (2000) (arguing
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often be difficult to prove nonconsent beyond a reasonable doubt absence evidence
of force by the perpetrator or resistance by the victim.”76 As a result, “few
commentators can point to any data suggesting that criminal rape reform laws have
deterred the commission of rape, increased its prosecution, or increased conviction
rates.”77
Victim advocates also sought an alternative to a criminal justice system that,
even at its best, “was too slow and poorly equipped to protect against the immediate
devastating consequences of assault,”78 and did not afford victims of intimate
physical abuse the agency and empowerment necessary to begin the healing
process.79 To address these concerns, advocates began lobbying legislatures for the
creation of a civil legal remedy similar to DVROs.80 Existing DVRO statutes applied
only to victims of abuse in a marital or similar relationship with their assailants, thus

that force and nonconsent are so intertwined that, in practice, it can be difficult to prove one
without the other).
76
Wertheimer, supra note 75, at 558–59; cf. Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay
on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1780, 1785–92 (1992) (maintaining that force and consent are separate and distinct
elements).
77
See Francis X. Shen, How We Still Fail Rape Victims: Reflecting on Responsibility
and Legal Reform, 22 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 58 (2011); cf. H. FEILD & L. BIENEN,
JURORS AND RAPE: A STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 7 (1980) (“The expressions of
outrage expressed over the antiquated state of rape laws in every American jurisdiction
usually neglect one fact: the fact that the rape laws did not result in convicting men of rape
was not a mistake or an oversight . . . . When juries refuse to convict for rape . . . the law
alone is not what needs to be changed.”).
78
Allegra M. McLeod, Regulating Sexual Harm: Strangers, Intimates, and Social
Institutional Reform, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1553, 1559 (2014) (quoting Seidman & Vickers,
supra note 65, at 472).
79
Merle H. Weiner, A Principled and Legal Approach to Title IX Reporting, 85 TENN.
L. REV. 71, 134, 173 n.461 (2017) (summarizing studies concluding that sexual assault
victims requiring reporting protocols that “consider the needs of victims themselves in terms
of their healing process . . . ,” and which recognize “the trauma that often accompanies a
sexual assault [victim, including] leav[ing] a victim’s memory and verbal skills impaired”);
see also Lisa Frohmann, Constituting Power in Sexual Assault Cases: Prosecutorial
Strategies for Victim Management, 45 SOC. PROBS. 393, 400–01 (1998) (finding that in rape
cases, prosecutors reinterpret victim trauma within a legal framework, preventing
empowerment); Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State
Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 577 (1999) (highlighting that, in the domestic violence
context, “[e]mpowerment provides a space for the battered woman to decide how to proceed
in the healing process”).
80
See, e.g., Jodoin, supra note 17, at 116–19 (describing the history for sexual assault
protection order in Massachusetts, which sprang from the state’s earlier history with
DVROs).
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preventing most rape survivors from accessing this flexible, victim-centered
protection regime.81
Unlike with DVRO legislation, however, states were reluctant to create
protection order avenues for individuals outside the traditional family context.
Although California’s Civil Harassment Restraining Order (passed in 1978)82 and
North Dakota’s “disorderly conduct” order (passed in 1993)83 technically offered
protection regardless of relationship status, no state specifically recognized sexual
assault as a ground for civil protection until Montana did so in 2001.84 But over the
next fifteen years, over two dozen states expanded their civil protection statutes to
cover non-partner sexual violence.85
C. The Uneven Emergence of SAPO Legislation
Unlike DVRO statutes, which have largely taken on a uniform quality across
the country, no single standard form of civil protection order exists for victims of
sexual assault. First, only twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia even offer
civil protection for sexual assault victims.86 Second, as discussed in greater detail
below, only five states have protection order statutes designed solely for sexual
assault.87 The other twenty-three jurisdictions offering sexual violence civil
protection do so only incidentally, authorizing victims to seek protection under more
generalized “harassment” or “violence” statutes that also apply to stalking victims

81

Smith, supra note 45, at 93–94 (recounting stories of sexual and other physical abuse
suffered by women who had no legal recourse “because they were not married” to their
abuser: “He savagely beat her and often raped her, once using a broken broomstick . . . . She
wanted a civil order of protection . . . [, but] was told that she was not entitled to an
order . . . against her abuser because they were not married . . . .”); see also id. at 108 (“Many
[domestic violence] statutes exclude violent crimes such as sexual assault . . . a surprising
number of states do not specifically include sexual assault within their definitions of
domestic violence . . . .”).
82
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (West 2019); Schild v. Rubin, 232 Cal. App. 3d 755,
762 (1991) (“In 1978 the Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure 527.6, a special statute
designed to afford protection against harassment.” (citing Stats. 1978, ch. 1307, §2, p. 4294)
(internal quotations omitted)).
83
1993 N.D. Laws Ch. 125 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01 (2019)).
84
2001 Mont. Laws Ch. 503 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-102 (2019)).
85
See generally ABA, DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 13 (summarizing
the twenty-eight states offering some form of civil protection relief to victims of sexual
assault); see also BATTERED WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT: NATIONAL CENTER ON
PROTECTION ORDERS AND FULL FAITH & CREDIT, Sexual Assault Protection Order Matrix
(2019),
https://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/ncpoffc-sexual-assault-protectionorder-matrix.pdf [https://perma.cc/6H5X-3B26].
86
Id; see also infra Table 1.
87
See infra Table 1.
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and noisy neighbor disputes.88 These “catch-all” protection order statutes vary
greatly in terms of scope (including who qualifies to petition and what acts of abuse
qualify as protection), procedures employed, evidentiary requirements, and
available remedies.
“Catch-all” statutes, broadly construed, govern any type of “civil harassment”
from noise complaints89 and easement disputes90 to terroristic threats91 and rape.92
These statutes present problems when applied to sexual assault, because evidentiary
requirements that might be advisable in a neighbor dispute—such as a “course of
conduct” requirement93—make little sense in the context of sexual assault. While
some of these “catch-all” statutes specifically define sexual assault as a qualifying
category of “harassment,” most grant relief on the same terms and through the same
processes as any other case.94 These statutes tend to create confusion, as reflected in

88
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (West 2019) (“Civil Harassment Restraining
Order” authorizing protection for “a person who has been harassed”); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 258E § 1 (West 2019) (Massachusetts protection order statute authorizing protection
for “[three] or more acts of willful and malicious conduct aimed at a specific person”); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01 (2019) (authorizing orders for “disorderly conduct,” defined as
“intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that are intended to adversely affect the
safety, security, or privacy of another person”).
89
Grant v. Clampitt, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727, 728–29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (considering
whether California’s “civil harassment injunction” action is automatically stayed by federal
bankruptcy law in a case involving “[a] noisy radio and a long-simmering feud between an
elderly woman and her former landlord”).
90
Clement v. Ziemer, 953 So. 2d 700, 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (reversing grant
of injunction under Florida’s catch-all protection order statute involving alleged misuse of a
ten-foot easement to access a neighborhood lake).
91
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.748 (2019) (authorizing civil harassment restraining
order for threats of violence); Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 565–66 (Minn. Ct. App.
2006) (finding statute constitutional because the only speech it regulates are “fighting words”
and “true threats”).
92
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6(b)(7) (West 2019) (authorizing civil harassment
restraining order to prevent “unlawful violence,” defined as “any assault or battery,”
including “sexual[] assault”).
93
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258E § 1 (West 2019) (requiring proof of three or
more separate incidents of misconduct); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (West 2019)
(requiring a petitioner to show by clear and convincing evidence that she has been harassed,
which is defined as a knowing and willful course of conduct); Grant, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730
(defining California’s “course of conduct” requirement as “a pattern of conduct composed
of a series of acts over a period of time”).
94
Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6(b)(6) (West 2019) (specifically referencing
“sexual assault” as a category of harassment), with Danielle S. v. Ezra C., No. A108727,
2005 WL 2840340, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2005) (struggling to interpret California’s
civil harassment statute in a sexual assault case, finding alternatively that “[a] single episode
of harassment cannot constitute a course of conduct” but that “there may well be cases in
which the circumstances surrounding ‘a single act of violence may support a conclusion that
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court cases expressing frustration over whether and how to treat sexual assault civil
protection order petitions differently from other petitions.95
In contrast, five states—Illinois,96 Nevada, 97 Pennsylvania,98 Oregon,99 and
Washington100—have crafted statutes designed solely and expressly to govern the
“unique” case of sexual assault. These statutes have the practical benefit of avoiding
the unjustified and confusing application of heightened burdens in “catch-all”
legislation. These narrowly focused statues also allow the legislature to highlight the
uniqueness of sexual assault as a grave violation and the need for a unique civil
remedy to address this violation. For example, Washington state recognizes
Sexual assault is the most heinous crime against another person short of
murder. Sexual assault inflicts humiliation, degradation, and terror on
victims. According to the FBI, a woman is raped every six minutes in the
United States. Rape is recognized as the most underreported crime;
estimates suggest that only one in seven rapes is reported to authorities.
Victims who do not report the crime still desire safety and protection from
future interactions with the offender. Some cases in which the rape is
reported are not prosecuted. In these situations, the victim should be able
to seek a civil remedy requiring that the offender stay away from the
victim.101

future harm is highly probable’” (quoting Russell v. Douvan, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 137, 141 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2003))).
95
See, e.g., D.R.B. by K.G.B. v. G.T.B., No. 17 NO 0452, 2018 WL 3414261, 2018Ohio-2787 (Ohio Ct. app., June 25, 2018) (acknowledging the difficulty in interpreting the
evidentiary difference between the requirements for a “civil stalking protection order” and a
“civil sexually oriented offense protection order,” both of which are governed by the same
statute); Ezra C., No. A108727, 2005 WL, at *2.
96
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 22/103 (West 2010) (“[V]ictim of non-consensual sexual
conduct or non-consensual sexual penetration . . . ”).
97
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.378(1) (2017) (“[A] person who reasonably believes that the
crime of sexual assault has been committed against him or her by another person . . . ”).
98
23 PA. CONST. STAT. § 6102(a) (2019) (defining “abuse” under statute as “rape,
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault, [or] statutory sexual assault”).
99
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.763 (West 2019) (“A person who has been subjected to
sexual abuse and who reasonably fears for the person’s physical safety . . . ”).
100
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.90.020 (West 2019) (requiring petition for sexual assault
protection order to “allege the existence of nonconsensual sexual conduct or nonconsensual
sexual penetration”).
101
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.90.005 (West 2019).
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Table 1 below illustrates the relatively recent emergence of SAPO legislation:
Table 1. Evolution of Civil Protection Order Legislation102
Year
“Catch-all” CPOs
SAPOs
2000
2
0
2005
6
1
2010
13
3
2015
22
5
2019
23
5
Table 1 highlights two important trends: 1) the rapid increase in civil protection
remedies for sexual violence in the last ten years; and 2) states’ continued reluctance
to treat sexual violence as a unique violation requiring a unique remedy. This
reluctance, driven in part by a misunderstanding of the enduring harm of sexual
violence, has led to the imposition of unjustified burdens for sexual assault victims
and the denial of relief for petitioners even when courts acknowledge respondents
have raped them.103
D. The Sexual Assault Protection Order Paradigm
Despite variation among state protection order statutes, SAPOs, like DVROs104
and other protection order regimes, exist to: 1) address a widespread humanitarian
crisis;105 2) affecting a discrete and vulnerable population;106 3) suffering from
profound physical, mental, or emotional violence;107 4) that is likely continue absent
102

Table 1 is reproduced in full in the Appendix at the end of this Article, complete
with citations to each state’s legislative bill and enacted statute. The citations have been
removed here for ease of reading.
103
See infra Part III.
104
See supra notes 45, 54–57 and accompanying text.
105
See BLACK ET AL., supra note 4 (confirming widespread epidemic of sexual assault
and disproportionate risks to women); Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, 53 n.8 (2d Cir. 2017)
(Chin, J., dissenting) (discussing the “large-scale epidemic of sexual assault and harassment
of women on college campuses around the country”); Fields, supra note 7, at 431 (“On
average, a sexual assault occurs every ninety-eight seconds; a rape occurs every six
minutes.”).
106
Sarah Swan, Triangulating Rape, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 403, 446
(2013) (arguing that “[w]omen, as members of a group particularly vulnerable to sexual
assault,” require different protection mechanisms); Sara L. Ainsworth, Amicus Curiae Brief:
Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 303, 305 (2013) (“All women are at
risk, but certain groups of women are particularly vulnerable to sexual assault.”).
107
Bessel A. van der Kolk, The Body Knows the Score: Memory and the Evolving
Psychobiology of Posttraumatic Stress, 1 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 253, 256 (1994),
http://franweiss.com/pdfs/sensorimotor_vanderkolk_1994.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JD6KTWZG] (“[T]rauma is stored in somatic memory and expressed as changes in biological
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intervention; and 5) which existing legal structures have failed to prevent. (6)
Finally, SAPOs afford the victim the agency to direct the course of protection.108
In furtherance of these objectives, some broadly uniform characteristics define
the SAPO paradigm. Unlike DVROs and some other protection order statutes,
sexual assault victims need not have any specific relationship (or any relationship at
all) with their assailant in order to obtain a SAPO. Anyone who has suffered a sexual
assault qualifies to petition for a SAPO, and anyone who has committed a sexual
assault is subject to sanction.109 What constitutes a qualifying act of “sexual assault”
varies, but virtually all state statutes define rape and sexual assault with reference to
their respective state criminal codes.110 Thus, SAPO petitioners benefit from the
expanded criminal rape definition resulting from rape reform law advocacy, even if
they remain largely unable to benefit under criminal law.111 However, many states
do not include non-criminal “sexual harassment” as a qualifying act of abuse.112
stress response. Intense emotions at the time of the trauma initiate the long-term conditional
responses to reminders of the event, which are associated both with chronic alterations in the
physiological stress response and with the amnesias and hypermnesias characteristic of
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). . . . Development of PTSD . . . was significantly more
likely in victims with histories of sexual abuse than in victims with no such histories.”);
Letter from Eileen Zurbiggen, Professor of Psychology, et al. to Daniel Hare, Chair Acad.
Senate of the Univ. of Cal. Sys. (Oct. 26, 2015), http://ucscfa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015
/10/UCSC-faculty-comments-on-SVSH-policy-10.26.15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7L5VWBQ6] (“Rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment are traumatic in part because the
victim loses control over his or her own body. A clearly established principle for recovery
from these traumatic experiences is to rebuild trust and to reestablish a sense of control over
one’s own fate and future.”).
108
LYNN LANGTON ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VICTIMIZATIONS NOT REPORTED TO THE
POLICE, 2006–2010, at 1 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vnrp0610.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EK8X-LP5C] (noting that, due to structural and systemic challenges of
prosecuting sexual assault in the criminal justice system, it is estimated that less than 0.6%
of all perpetrators ever spend a day behind bars); Jodoin, supra note 17, at 111–13
(describing empowering effects of SAPO legislation and attendant increase in public safety
resulting from an increased willingness to cooperate with law enforcement when the victim
has been empowered to make her own decisions).
109
See, e.g., Roake v. Delman, 408 P.3d 658, 659 (Wash. 2018) (describing the
legislative intent behind Washington’s SAPO statute, and that of similar statutes nationwide,
to broaden relief to those not involved in dating or marital relationships).
110
See, e.g., 23 PA. CONST. STAT. § 6102(a) (2019) (defining sexual assault with
reference to state’s criminal codes); ME. STAT. tit. 19, § 4005 (2018) (defining sexual
assault); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1503 (West 2012) (defining sexual assault).
111
See, e.g., Sexual Assault Protection Order Act, H.B. 2576, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws
Ch. 138 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.90.010(4) (West 2019)) (House Bill
enacting Washington’s SAPO statute and defining “sexual conduct” to include “intentional
or knowing touching,” “intentional or knowing display,” “any forced display,” “any coerced
or forced touching,” and certain “nonphysical contact”).
112
See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.378 (“[A] person who reasonably believes that the
crime of sexual assault has been committed against him or her by another person may petition
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SAPO procedures remain relatively uniform. A petitioner may seek an ex parte
temporary (or emergency) protection order lasting two to three weeks, but notice of
a permanent protection order hearing must be provided to the respondent as soon as
possible.113 Hearings are commonly held within one month of the issuance of a
temporary protection order unless otherwise stipulated by the parties, and hearings
are almost always resolved in a single day.114
Remedies vary by jurisdiction, but the most common types of remedies reflect
a focus on prospective, victim-centered protection. Assailants must physically stay
away from victims and may have no contact with the victims whatsoever.115 In many
jurisdictions, assailants must provide economic compensation related to the healing
process, including “medical expenses, counseling expenses, temporary shelter or
housing expenses, and expenses to repair or replace damaged property.”116 In
addition, any violation of a protection order constitutes a criminal offense.117 Other
remedies appear aimed, at least in part, on general societal protection and individual
rehabilitation, including requiring the assailant to relinquish firearms or enter a
substance abuse treatment program.118 But these remedies also provide a necessary
additional layer of comfort and safety to petitioners as they begin the recovery
process.

. . . for a temporary or extended [protective] order . . .”) (emphasis added); OKLA. STAT. tit.
22, § 60.2 (2019) (offering emergency protection only to victims of domestic abuse, stalking,
criminal harassment, or rape); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(A)(6) (defining “sexually
oriented offense” authorizing issuance of a protective order by reference to the definition of
“sexually oriented offense” in Ohio’s criminal code).
113
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.65.850 (West 2019) (requiring notice of
permanent restraining order hearing to be given to respondent at least ten days prior to
hearing).
114
See infra Table 1 and accompanying notes 316–320.
115
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950a (2019) (allowing court to enjoin an
individual from “[a]ppearing within the sight of the petitioner” or “[approach] . . . the
petitioner”); MINN. STAT. § 609.748 (2019) (allowing court to “order[] the respondent to
have no contact with [petitioner]”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50C-5 (2018) (allowing court to issue
a “no-contact order”); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 22/103 (West 2010) (“‘Stay away’ means to
refrain from both physical presence and nonphysical contact with the petitioner directly,
indirectly, or through third parties who may not know of the order. ‘Nonphysical contact’
includes, but is not limited to, telephone calls, mail, e-mail, fax, and written notes.”).
116
Smith, supra note 45, at 104.
117
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50C-10 (2018) (mandating contempt of court for
“knowing violation[s]”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2705.02 (West 2018) (permitting criminal
prosecution and contempt of court for violations); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01 (2019)
(“[V]iolation of the order is a class A misdemeanor.”).
118
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(F)(2) (West 2019) (authorizing notice
for relinquishment of firearms); cf. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7A.05(a)(2)(D) (West
2019) (authorizing gun restraint “unless offender is a peace officer . . . actively engaged in
employment as a sworn full-time paid employee of a state agency or political subdivision”).

2020]

SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND FUTURE HARM

199

The most significant divergence between various SAPO statutes concerns
evidentiary requirements and standards of proof. Exactly half of the existing SAPO
statutes require proof of a prior sexual assault and a reasonable fear of a future sexual
assault from the assailant, while the other half require only proof of a prior sexual
assault.119 At least two states expressly require that future harm is “imminent,”120
and California requires proof both of a past “course of conduct” and proof that the
same type of harm (i.e., another sexual assault) is likely to occur in the future.121 It
also bears emphasis that twenty-two states offer no civil protection for non-partner
sexual violence, leaving victims in these states to prove “imminent irreparable
injury” and a likelihood of success on the merits through the much slower civil
preliminary injunction remedy.122
Regarding burdens of proof, more than seventy percent of states require proof
by a preponderance of the evidence or a similar standard that a sexual assault has
occurred. 123 California and Wyoming require such proof by clear and convincing
evidence.124 But states requiring an additional showing of future harm employ
different burdens of proof for this prong, with some states requiring only a
“reasonable belief” akin to asylum’s “well-founded fear” standard, and other states
requiring proof by a preponderance. 125 A surprising number of statutes are silent on
the appropriate burden of proof entirely,126 an unfortunate omission leaving
significant room for debate over whether protection proceedings are inherently
“civil” or “quasi-criminal” in nature.127

119

See Appendix, Table 2.
FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (2019) (governing protective orders and temporary restraining
orders); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1503 (West 2019) (granting relief if
petitioner alleges “[a]n act that places the petitioner in fear of imminent serious bodily
harm”).
121
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (West 2019).
122
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (West 2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
258E § 1 (West 2019); N.D. CENT. CODE, § 12.1-31.2-01 (2019).
123
See infra Table 2.
124
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (West 2019); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 7-3-508(b) (2019)
(“If the court determines . . . that there exists a clear and present danger of further stalking,
sexual assault or of serious physical adverse consequences to any person, the court may grant
ex parte a temporary order of protection pending the hearing.”).
125
See infra Table 2.
126
Id.
127
Rynearson v. Ferguson, 903 F.3d 920, 933 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The mere fact that
protection order law refers to criminal statutes does not mean that protection order
proceedings are quasi-criminal.”); cf. Kelm v. Hyatt, 44 F.3d 415, 423 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[A]
civil protection order is quasi-criminal in nature.”); Tamara L. Kuennen, “No-Drop” Civil
Protection Orders: Exploring the Bounds of Judicial Intervention in the Lives of Domestic
Violence Victims, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 44 (2007) (“The quasi-criminal nature of
CPOs, as compared with traditional injunctions, may cause a judge to take a more
interventionist, rather than deferential, approach.”).
120

200

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

These unresolved evidentiary issues in SAPO statutes constitute the most
significant barriers to entry for sexual assault victims in need of immediate
protection. The following section examines why onerous evidentiary burdens
regarding “future harm” are unjustified in the context of SAPOs. In doing so, it
highlights the growing debate over “victim-led” sexual assault adjudications on
college campuses and explores how comparisons to domestic violence and other
traditional protection order regimes do little to resolve the stalemate. This discussion
prefaces Part III, which offers a novel comparison of sexual violence to persecution
in asylum law and explores how the lesson of asylum law can provide a principled
justification for a uniform set of burdens premised on a single act of abuse, a
rebuttable presumption of future harm, and a preponderance of the evidence burden
of proof.
II. SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND “PROOF” OF FUTURE HARM
One of the most enduring and vexing problems of punishing sexual violence
through the criminal justice system is the challenge of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that a nonconsensual sexual contact occurred. Absent forcible struggle or
eyewitnesses, there often exists a lack of independently corroborating evidence.128
Cases often become a credibility battle between the accused and the accuser, where
denials that a sex act occurred—or more frequently, claims that the alleged victim
consented—appear plausible enough to cast reasonable doubt over the prosecutor’s
case.129 This plausibility has created the “widespread perception that word-on-word
cases . . . are not provable,” giving jurors pause to ever return a conviction absent a
wealth of “CSI-style” forensic evidence.130
Prosecutors are mindful of this reality that, “with many sexual assault cases, the
limited evidence [makes] proving the case beyond a reasonable doubt incredibly
difficult.”131 This has a downstream effect on how many rape cases come to trial, as
128
The “uniquely intimate nature of a sexual assault crime” also has a chilling effect on
victim participation in the criminal justice system, where “the prosecution may seek to
disclose information about the victim that he or she would not like publicized.” Erin Gardner
Schenk & David L. Shakes, Into the Wild Blue Yonder of Legal Representation for Victims
of Sexual Assault: Can U.S. State Courts Learn From the Military?, 6 U. DENV. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 8–9 (2016).
129
See, e.g., Tuerkheimer, supra note 9, at 35 (quoting officers who discount
acquaintance rape allegations as mere expressions of regret over a consensual encounter: “‘I
don’t have time to deal with . . . wake-up and regret. You did what you did. That’s that. It’s
not a crime and don’t take up our time with it.’ The regret trope is premised on a notion that
consensual sex is often rued in retrospect; this lament is perceived as the impetus for
fabricating rape allegations.”).
130
Id. at 5.
131
Dominic S. Angiollo, Risky Sexual Behavior – The “Broken Windows” of Sexual
Assault: A Proposal for Universities to Incorporate Targeted Intervention to Bridge the Gap
Between Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, 26 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
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“prosecutors generally impose far more stringent standards on the decision to
proceed with charges” than is required by law.132 This self-imposed “convictability
standard” prematurely screens out thousands of meritorious cases.133
Other, more sinister factors are at work as well. In her article Incredible Women,
Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer offers a compelling argument about why “he
said/she said” cases almost always discount the “she said” portion of the equation:
Rape allegations are, and always have been, deeply intertwined with
questions of credibility. In the paradigmatic case of ‘he said/she said,’
accuser and accused offer two opposing versions of events: one party is
telling the truth; the other is not. To pick between competing accounts, the
decider must judge credibility.
Accusers – typically women – do not tend to fare well in these contests.
Over time, skepticism of rape complaints has remained firmly lodged,
migrating from formal legal rules to informal practices, toward much the
same end – the dismissal of women’s reports of sexual violation. Although
systemic disbelief is variegated, the staying power of what I call
‘credibility discounting’ is the dominant feature of our legal response to
rape.134
This “credibility discount” follows women into court, be it in a criminal or civil
context. But as one prosecutor explained, it may be abundantly clear that “the
accused demonstrated troubling [or threatening] judgment preceding and during the
sexual encounter” sufficient to warrant prospective protection from future
threatening actions, even if the recipient of those actions cannot be adjudicated a
“victim” under criminal law.135 SAPOs as an alternative to traditional prosecution,
with lower evidentiary burdens and prospective remedies, function well to address
these problems where the criminal justice system fails.
But SAPOs and other protection order regimes present evidentiary problems of
their own. As statutes offering prospective relief from future harm, one reasonably
expects any such relief to be premised on a reasonable prediction of future harm
based on past events. Moreover, SAPO statutes seek to grant relief to petitioners
based on proof of a violent criminal act by the respondent, raising due process
881, 888 (2018) (Even with rape reform laws expanding the definition of rape and
eliminating force as an element, there often simply exists a lack of evidence to “prove that
the accused actually committed a sexual assault, based on the legal definition and the
available evidence.”).
132
Tuerkheimer, supra note 9, at 37.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 3.
135
Angiollo, supra note 131, at 888 (describing a case in which, “[b]ased on the
accused’s aggressive actions with a new partner, it was no surprise that the encounter was
rife with issues of consent”).
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concerns for the accused even if the adjudication takes place in civil court.136 These
unique characteristics of SAPOs give rise to three distinct evidentiary issues,
discussed further below, regarding future harm related to (1) establishing a pattern
of past acts; (2) establishing fear of future harm; and (3) burden of proof.
1) Pattern of Past Acts: If courts are asked to predict future harm based on past
acts, must petitioners show a pattern of past abuse to qualify for protection order
relief? Sometimes called the “course of conduct” requirement, at least one “catchall” statute requires petitioners to produce evidence of multiple, separate assaults to
demonstrate a likelihood of future harm.137
2) Fear of Future Harm: Can petitioners demonstrate a fear of future assault
solely through evidence of past assaults, or must they provide independent proof that
they “reasonably fear future harm” from their attackers? Moreover, what type of
future “harm” must petitioners show? Half of the nation’s SAPO statutes impose an
independent “reasonable fear of future harm” requirement, with some even requiring
proof of the same type of future harm.138 Some courts have denied protection orders
on these grounds for failure to satisfy this burden even when petitioners prove that
past sexual assaults occurred.139
3) Burden of Proof: By what standard must petitioners prove a likelihood of
future harm? Despite debates over burdens of proof in Title IX sexual assault
cases,140 all but two SAPO statutes require proof of past acts by a preponderance of
the evidence.141 But statutes vary considerably regarding the appropriate burden of
proof for future harm.
This Part explores how various states and courts have addressed all three issues,
highlighting how higher burdens of production and proof do harm both to the
purpose and practical efficacy of SAPO statutes.

136

See Crespo v. Crespo, 972 A.2d 1169, 1175 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009)
(considering constitutional due process challenge to New Jersey’s DVRO statute and its
preponderance standard); State v. Karas, 32 P.3d 1016, 1020–21 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)
(rejecting due process challenge to Washington’s DVRO statute, which permitted temporary
restraining orders to be granted ex parte).
137
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (West 2019).
138
See infra Table 2.
139
See, e.g., Morrell v. Chadick, 965 So. 2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)
(reversing grant of protection order despite proof of past sexual assault because there was no
evidence the attack was likely to occur again in the future). Of course, sexual violence
petitioners in one of the twenty-three states without SAPO legislation must not only prove
future harm, but an “imminent risk of irreparable [future] injury” absent a civil injunction.
See Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 840 F.3d 1244, 1248 (11th Cir. 2016).
140
See 2017 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 31 (criticizing Obama Administration’s
recommendation of a preponderance of the evidence standard in Title IX sexual assault
hearings and suggesting that a clear and convincing evidence standard can better serve the
interests of due process).
141
See infra Table 2.
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A. Pattern of Past Acts
“The best predictor of future behavior is past behavior.”142 Given the
prospective nature of protection orders, courts understandably scrutinize the past
behavior of respondents before determining whether to place restraints on their
future conduct.143 But can a single act of bad behavior accurately predict future bad
behavior? Some states have answered “no” in the context of civil protection orders,
and require petitioners to demonstrate a “course of conduct” through multiple acts
of abusive behavior before obtaining an order, as discussed below.
Some behaviors require multiple independent actions by definition. Stalking,
for example, often consists of “repeatedly following or harassing another
person. . . .”144 Not surprisingly, protection order statutes for stalking require proof
of multiple independent acts. For example, Florida’s “protective injunctions” statute
requires proof of “two incidents of . . . stalking,”145 while North Carolina’s stalking
statute requires proof that “[o]n more than one occasion” the respondent “follow[ed]
or otherwise harass[ed]” petitioner.146 Courts have also interpreted stalking
protection order statutes to require a course of conduct, even in the absence of clear
legislative directive.147

142

See Coble v. Davis, 682 F. App’x 261, 271 (5th Cir. 2017); M. Neil Browne &
Ronda R. Harrison-Spoerl, Putting Expert Testimony in Its Epistemological Place: What
Predictions of Dangerousness in Court Can Teach Us, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, n.284 (2008)
(“The adage . . . appears to be supported by the research.”); JOHN MONAHAL, THE CLINICAL
PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 44–49 (1981) (“If there is one finding that overshadows
all others in the area of prediction, it is that the probability of future crime increases with
each prior criminal act.”).
143
See San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 870 F. Supp.
2d 943, 964 (E.D. Ca. 2012) (granting injunction because, “[a]lthough no party can predict
exactly” what people will do, “past conduct indicates a reasonable expectation that the
conduct may be repeated”).
144
Stalking, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/stalking
[https://perma.cc/4UAR-ESR4] (last visited Oct. 25, 2019); DEL. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
COORDINATING COUNCIL, 20 YEAR REPORT 6 (2014) (“Stalking is a distinctive form of
criminal activity composed of a series of actions that, if taken individually, might constitute
legal behavior.”).
145
FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (2019).
146
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50C-1 (2018); see also Watts v. Hensley, 4 P.3d 45, 46 (Okla.
Civ. App. 1999) (requiring a victim of stalking to provide evidence “of a knowing and willful
course or pattern of conduct”).
147
See Sullivan v. Willhoite, 2018-Ohio-4234, at ¶ 16, *8 (Ohio Ct. App 2018)
(affirming denial of civil stalking protection order because plaintiff failed to establish two or
more incidents that would cause him to fear physical harm or mental distress); Nwosu v.
Underwood, 2007-Ohio-1907, at ¶ 16 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (stating civil stalking protection
orders “were not enacted for the purpose of alleviating uncomfortable situations, but to
prevent the type of persistent and threatening harassment that leaves victims in constant fear
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Other misconduct, though not inherently defined by a pattern of conduct, may
by itself be legal or otherwise trivial enough that courts will require a continuing
“course of conduct” before granting a protective order. “Catch-all” statutes like
California’s Civil Harassment Restraining Order148 broadly govern virtually any
type of harassing or annoying behavior, including parking in a neighbor’s
driveway,149 playing basketball in one’s own backyard,150 or arguing over a child’s
school pickup time.151 Given the comparatively minor harms associated with a single
incident, courts considering these types of “harassment” require a “course of
conduct” before granting an order.152 This requirement serves both to ensure that the
threshold of past misconduct is sufficiently high to constitute harassment and to
accurately predict whether this type of sub-criminal harassment will continue in the
future.153
Sexual assault is not stalking. It does not require a pattern of conduct to be
completed. Nor is sexual assault trivial “uncomfortable” behavior.154 It need not
happen multiple times to cross any threshold for “harassment.” Indeed, by requiring
a pattern of repeated sexual assaults to secure relief would suggest that courts cannot
adequately judge a perpetrator’s sexually violent propensities without multiple past
acts of violence from which to predict future behavior.
This reasoning fails for two reasons. First, it too narrowly defines “future
harm.” Victims of rape need not be raped again by their assailants to experience
harm from them; the attacker’s presence alone can prove devastating and
traumatic.155 Psychological research on the post-traumatic effects of sexual violence
shows that, for many sexual assault victims, a mere encounter with the assailant can

of physical danger” (citation omitted) (quoting Kramer v. Kramer, 2002-Ohio-4383, at ¶ 17
(Ohio Ct. App. 2002))).
148
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (West 2019).
149
Byers v. Cathcart, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 398, 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (denying
injunction request because there was arguably “a legitimate purpose” for the conduct).
150
Schild v. Rubin, 283 Cal. Rptr. 533, 537 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (considering whether
“the noise from a ball and the verbal chatter by several people engaged in recreational
basketball play in [a] residential backyard” could “constitute unlawful harassment . . .”).
151
Harris v. Stampolis, 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 12 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (granting injunction
upon evidence showing a course of conduct indicative of a “credible threat of violence,”
including “placing his hands close to [the principal,] raising his voice, pointing and gesturing,
and walking back and forth toward her . . .”).
152
See Schild, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 537; Harris, 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 10–11.
153
Some state “catch-all” statutes do not require a course of conduct. See Wetzel v.
Schlenvogt, 705 N.W.2d 836, 838 (N.D. 2005) (affirming grant of restraining order arising
from customer’s actions of hitting employee because the “disorderly conduct restraining
order does not require a pattern of behavior”); cf. Ramsey v. Harman, 661 S.E.2d 924, 927–
28 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (vacating restraining order despite finding that a blogger had
consistently and repeatedly sent petitioner aggressive messages).
154
Nwosu, 2007-Ohio-1907 at ¶ 16.
155
See van der Kolk, supra note 107, at 95–102.
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be as devastating and frightening as the actual attack.156 Indeed, victims “can reexperience the mental anguish of the assault whenever they re-encounter the
perpetrator.”157 This mental anguish is compounded with repeated encounters, such
as at work or school.158 This type of distress merits consideration, given that nearly
three-quarters of all sexual assault victims must face ongoing contact with their
assailants.159
Second, it discounts the dangerous propensities of sexual assault perpetrators.
A momentary lapse in judgment leading to a spiteful blog post or aggressive driving
is qualitatively different from the perpetration of a sexual assault.160 Not only is this
“most heinous crime” more serious by orders of magnitude, but a single act of sexual
aggression has been recognized as a leading indicator of future violent behavior.161
Danger and lethality assessments, created by the Centers for Disease Control and
widely used to predict which victims of domestic abuse face a high risk of death
from their abusers, recognize sexually aggressive behavior as a leading indicator of
future violence.162 While proof of six rapes would provide greater evidence of future
violence, a single sexual assault more than suffices.163
Most states recognize the impropriety of requiring multiple past acts of sexual
assault as a predicate for granting protective relief, even if multiple acts are required
for other misconduct.164 Alaska is a noteworthy example. Alaska enacted one of the
156

Id.
Sarah Deer, Expanding the Network of Safety: Tribal Protection Orders for
Survivors of Sexual Assault, 4 TRIBAL L.J. 3, 37 (2004).
158
Id.
159
Fields, supra note 7, at 433.
160
While these types of actions can be considered harassment under certain
circumstances, standing along, they provide little evidence of a pattern of recidivist behavior.
161
See generally Elizabeth D. Kolivas & Alan M. Gross, Assessing Sexual Aggression:
Addressing the Gap Between Rape Victimization and Perpetration Prevalence Rates, 12
AGGRESSION AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 315 (2006), http://www.genderbias.net/docs/resource
s/guideline/Assessing%20sexual%20aggression%20Addressing%20the%20gap%20betwee
n%20rape.pdf [https://perma.cc/NFS4-XAFX] (highlighting the increased prevalence of
violence among men who had a past history of sexual aggression).
162
KATHLEEN C. BASILE ET AL., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE VICTIMIZATION ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS FOR USE IN
HEALTHCARE SETTINGS (2007), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/ipv/ipvandsv
screening.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5CG-BYWH]. Moreover, while only approximately 6% of
men ever attempt or complete a rape, 63% of these men are repeat offenders. Fields, supra
note 7, at 445.
163
See, e.g., Russell v. Wofford, 816 S.E.2d 909 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018) (granting civil
no contact order based on multiple separate incidents of sexually aggressive behavior,
including defendant grabbing plaintiff’s breasts without her consent and repeatedly having
his erectile dysfunction medication delivered to her home).
164
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.748 (2019) (defining “harassment” as “a single incident
of physical or sexual assault . . . or repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words,
or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect”); Hanson v. Burridge, A16-2069, 2017 WL
157
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earliest and most progressive SAPOs in 2006,165 a credit to the state with by far the
highest per capita rate of forcible rape in the country.166 Alaska’s statute, which
covers both “stalking and sexual assault,” only requires a showing by a
“preponderance of the evidence that the respondent has committed . . . sexual assault
against the petitioner, regardless of whether the respondent appears at the
hearing.”167 The plain language of the statute does not require any proof of
reasonable fear of future harm, nor does it require proof of more than one act of
sexual assault.168 In addition, the statute specifically prevents a court from denying
a petition “solely because of a lack of time between an act of sexual assault and the
filing of the petition.”169
However, some “catch-all” statutes requiring a course of conduct for some
behaviors have created confusion for petitioners seeking a streamlined protection
remedy, and for courts trying to divine legislative intent.170 Florida’s statute appears
particularly confusing. While 2003 amendments to Florida’s “catch-all” statute
suggest that one act of sexual violence will suffice where multiple acts of other types
of violence or harassment are required in the same statute,171 cases interpreting this
statute in the sexual violence context repeatedly focus on the statute’s requirement

3378284, at *3, *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2017) (affirming grant of restraining order based
on single act where male dorm mate touched female dorm mate’s sexual organs while she
slept).
165
See S.B. 54, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws Ch. 36 (“Amending protective order statutes
for crimes involving stalking to include crimes involving sexual assault and sexual
abuse . . . ”) (currently codified at ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.65.850 (West 2019)).
166
Statista Research Department, Forcible rape rate per 100,000 inhabitants in the
United States in 2017, by state, STATISTA (last edited Aug. 9, 2019),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/232563/forcible-rape-rate-in-the-us-by-state/ [https://per
ma.cc/56F5-XRMJ] (showing that 116.7 Alaskans are raped for every 100,000 people in the
state, a rate 65% percent higher than Michigan, the second highest state).
167
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.65.850(a)-(b) (West 2019).
168
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.65.850 (West 2019). While a regular petition for a
protective order does not require a showing of future harm, the statute does require such a
showing for “an emergency protective order” filed by a “peace officer, on behalf of and with
the consent of the victim.” ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.65.855(b) (West 2019) (The court “shall
issue an emergency protective order . . . [i]f the Court finds probable cause to believe that
the petitioner is in immediate danger of . . . sexual assault based on an allegation of the recent
commission of . . . sexual assault”). Emergency protective orders expire after 72 hours. Id.
169
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.65.850(e) (West 2019).
170
See, e.g., D.R.B. by K.G.B. v. G.T.B., No. 17 NO 0452, 2018 WL 3414261, 2018Ohio-2787 (Ohio Ct. app., June 25, 2018) (acknowledging the difficulty in interpreting the
evidentiary difference between the requirements for a “civil stalking protection order” and a
“civil sexually oriented offense protection order,” both of which are governed by the same
statute).
171
FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (2019).
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of two or more “overt acts.”172 Coupled with the statute’s “imminent fear of future
harm” requirement, Florida’s statute creates nearly insurmountable barriers for
sexual violence victims.173
Contrasted with the progressive SAPO order of Alaska, one of the least
populated states in the country, the most populated state in the country—
California— has perhaps the most regressive statute.174 California’s catch-all Civil
Harassment Restraining Order was the first statute in the country to offer civil
protection relief for anyone outside the marital relationship, including a non-partner
victim of sexual violence.175 But the same onerous evidentiary burdens governing
stalking and neighbor disputes in 1979 continue to govern sexual assaults in 2019;
California requires proof of a past “course of conduct” comprised of at least two
separate incidents giving rise to a separate reasonable fear of future harm, both of
which must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.176
B. Fear of Future Harm
“The purpose of [a] civil protection order is not to address past abuse,” but “to
protect the petitioner from future harm.”177 In fact, protection order remedies do not
172

See, e.g., Cannon v. Thomas, 133 So. 3d 634, 638–39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)
(denying restraining order because, “[a]lthough Appellant committed a vicious attack on
Appellee’s daughter, Appellee . . . never described two distinct acts of violence”); Corrie v.
Keul, 160 So. 3d 97, 98–99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (reversing grant of injunction despite
evidence that respondent had anger issues and threatened to take the complainant’s home
and have him thrown in jail, screamed at him, and chased him and his dogs down the
sidewalk, because no “overt act on [the neighbor]’s part indicated an ability to carry out” the
attack).
173
See, e.g., Gagnard v. Sticht, 886 So. 2d 321, 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (per
curiam) (finding that although respondent threatened to kill petitioner and “‘F’ him up,” no
injunction could issue without “overt acts indicating ability to carry out the threats or
justifying a belief that violence was imminent”); Russell v. Doughty, 28 So. 3d 169, 170
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam) (holding that yelling profanities and threatening
petitioner, even after documented case of battery, was not sufficient for restraining order
without evidence that respondent took an action creating a “well-founded fear that violence
was imminent”).
174
See US States–Ranked by Population 2019, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW
http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/ [https://perma.cc/UQC9-GNPB] (last visited Oct.
19, 2019) (listing California as the most populated state with nearly 40 million people, and
Alaska as the forty-eighth most populated state, with 738,068 residents).
175
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (West 2019).
176
Id.
177
Wetterman v. B.C., 2013-Ohio-57, at ¶ 20–22 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013); see also
Rodriguez v. Sessions, 876 F.3d 280, 285 (7th Cir. 2017) (“A protection order is any
injunction issued for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts of domestic
violence.”) (citation omitted); Russell v. Douvan, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 401 (“[A] prohibitory
injunction necessarily addresses future conduct.”).
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provide any redress for past abuse in the traditional sense; “the primary purpose of
the order is to protect the petitioner, not punish the respondent.”178 Thus, even if a
court finds that past abuse occurred, it must nonetheless consider whether a
likelihood of future harm to the petitioner exists. In some contexts, such as domestic
violence, courts presume a likelihood of future harm given the close nature of the
relationship between petitioner and respondent.179 In contrast, if an assailant is
serving a life sentence in a maximum security federal prison, a court would likely
find no need for a protection order.180
Where does sexual assault fall along this continuum of likely future harm? An
automatic, irrebuttable presumption of future harm similar to domestic violence
seems less justifiable, at least to the extent that sexual violence protection orders do
not require the existence of a past or current romantic relationship. Yet there appears
to be significant justification for a rebuttable presumption of future harm in the case
of sexual assault. The vast majority of sexual assault victims are assaulted by close
acquaintances, people with whom they live, work, socialize, or attend school.181
Moreover, as discussed above, the type of devastating harm felt by sexual assault
victims when forced to interact with their assailants provide compelling support for
a presumption of future harm, even in the absence of a pattern of sexually aggressive
behavior.182
Recognizing this reality, fourteen states do not require independent proof of
future harm for a sexual assault protection order to issue; proof of past sexual
violence suffices.183 For example, Tennessee requires only proof of past “sexual
assault by a preponderance of the evidence,”184 and at least one Texas court rejected
a challenge to its state SAPO statute by finding that a single conviction of past sexual
violence was sufficient for a protective order in the absence of future harm.185
178

Rynearson v. Ferguson, 903 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 2018).
See Fields, supra note 7, at 466; see also Merle H. Weiner, Potential and Challenges
of Transnational Litigation for Feminists Concerned About Domestic Violence Here and
Abroad, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 749, 769–72 (2002) (discussing propriety of
presumption of awarding child custody to battered spouse given likelihood of future harm at
the hands of the batterer).
180
Fields, supra note 7, at 469 (“Or to the put the point more directly, a victim need not
seek prospective relief protecting her from her attacker if the attacker is dead.”).
181
Id.
182
See van der Kolk, supra note 107, at 104; see also supra notes 155–159 and
accompanying discussion.
183
See infra Table 2; see also, e.g., Emery v. Bryand, No. A13-1146, 2013 WL
6839922, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2013) (affirming grant of protection order based on
single act of sexual assault because the plain language of Minnesota’s statute “does not
require a finding or—an allegation—of ‘an immediate and present danger of harassment’”)
(citation omitted).
184
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605 (West 2019).
185
L.S. v. Shawn, No. 13-17-00224-CV, 2018 WL 4100857, at *4 (Tex. App. Aug. 29,
2018) (previous guilty plea to felony indecency with a child was sufficient to sustain
protective order).
179
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Likewise, in rejecting a claim that a protection order must be predicated on proof of
future harm, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit explained an “important
factor in issuing a CPO is whether it ‘provides a measure of peace of mind for those
whose benefit it was issued.’”186 Because “[t]he purpose of . . . a civil protection
order . . . is to protect the moving party, rather than punish the offender,” recognition
of an adjudicated sexual violence victim’s safety needs is sufficient.187
But such a rebuttable presumption does not exist in half of the twenty-eight
jurisdictions providing civil protective relief for sexual violence victims, nor in any
of the twenty-three jurisdictions authorizing civil law injunctions.188 Thus, a
majority of states require the petitioner to prove not only that she suffered a past act
of sexual abuse, but that she also independently fears future harm from the
respondent.189 Some states even require proof of a reasonable likelihood that the
same type of harm already inflicted will occur again in the future, absent a protective
order.190 In other words, these states require a sexual violence victim to somehow
prove that she likely faces another sexual assault specifically again by her same
attacker.
Florida’s statute requiring proof that a future attack of sexual violence is
“imminent” seems particularly harmful and ill-suited to the realities of sexual
assault.191 Florida courts have regularly held that proof of multiple non-sexually
aggressive acts—including numerous murder threats192 and multiple batteries

186
Salvattera v. Ramirez, 111 A.3d 1032, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Maldonado
v. Maldonado, 631 A.2d 40, 43 (D.C. 1993)).
187
Ba v. United States, 809 A.2d 1178, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Cruz-Foster v.
Foster, 597 A.2d 927, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1991)); cf. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103 (2019)
(providing a court order available to an adjudicated plaintiff “if the court finds that the
defendant has abused the plaintiff, and . . . [t]here is a danger of further abuse”).
188
See infra Table 2.
189
See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 62A06 (2019) (“[T]he plaintiff must . . . assert that
[she] . . . is a victim of sexual violence or intimidation; and . . . prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the plaintiff . . . is at a continued risk of harm from the defendant.”); MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1505 (2019) (authorizing grant of a “peace order” if the
judge finds “by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent has committed, and is
likely to commit in the future, an act [of sexual violence]”).
190
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-16a(b) (2019) (granting a protection order for
sexual assault “[i]f the court finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
respondent has committed acts constituting grounds for issuance . . . and will continue to
commit such acts”); Kayla M. v. Greene, 126 A.3d 1, 3 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016) (finding that
Connecticut’s civil protection order statute requiring proof that the same type of harassment
encountered in the past is likely to occur in the future).
191
FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (2019).
192
Tash v. Rogers, 246 So. 3d 1304, 1305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (mem.) (denying
injunction despite multiple threats that respondent would “kill [petitioner] and his family”
because such threats “did not constitute an assault or enumerated act of violence”); Perez v.
Siegel, 857 So. 2d 353, 354, 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (finding trial court erred in
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coupled with threats of violence193—are insufficient for a protective order absent
independent evidence of an “overt act” making a future attack “imminent.”194
Disturbingly, that same standard has typically been applied in cases of sexual
violence.195
For example, in Morrell v. Chadick,196 a Florida court found that an employer
had intimidated an employee into having sex with her by repeatedly demanding
sexual favors at work, screaming that “it was unacceptable” that she refused sex
when she tried to deny him, and continued harassing her after she quit her job, in
part by calling her new employer so frequently to demand sex that the new employer
terminated her.197 Viewing this pattern of behavior through a shockingly regressive
lens, the court found that no past sexual assault had occurred, noting that the
respondent “was never physically violent towards Ms. Chadick,” and that “none of
the [phone] messages contained violent language or threats of violence.”198 Her
testimony “belied her claim . . . that she was in imminent danger of becoming a
victim of an act of sexual violence.”199
The court went further, observing that:
[W]hile evidence of past alleged nonconsensual sexual encounters not
involving criminal charges might under certain facts constitute grounds for
an injunction for protection against sexual violence . . . it is not clear
whether in this case such findings, standing alone, would have been legally
sufficient to support an injunction against sexual violence without a
showing that a threat of sexual violence was imminent.200
While catch-all statutes like Florida’s impose unnecessary future harm
requirements better suited for less serious harassment, at least two “SAPO-only”
state statutes also impose such a requirement.201 Washington’s SAPO statute
contains ambiguous language on the future harm requirement,202 an ambiguity the
granting injunction where tenant screamed at and threatened to kill their condominium
owners because the activity “does not qualify as an assault”).
193
Cannon v. Thomas, 133 So. 3d 634, 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (providing a
ruling against the petitioner although a parent’s daughter was viciously assaulted by an
assailant, because the parent did not allege two acts of violence).
194
Id.
195
See Morrell v. Chadick, 965 So. 2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
196
Id.
197
Id. at 1278–79.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 1280.
200
Id. at 1281.
201
See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.90.020 (2019); 23 PA. CONST. STAT. § 6102(a) (2019).
202
Section 7.90.090, titled “Burden of proof – Issuance of protection order – Remedies
– Violations,” appears on its face to only require proof “by a preponderance of the evidence
that the petitioner has been a victim of nonconsensual sexual conduct,” at which point “the
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Supreme Court of Washington confronted in a case highlighting the impropriety of
an independent future harm requirement for sexual violence victims.203
In May 2014, University of Washington student Megan Roake met Maxwell
Delman at a college party.204 After the party, both students returned to Roake’s dorm,
where Delman allegedly sexually assaulted her.205 In September 2014, Roake
reported the incident to the Seattle Police Department and the university.206 She told
friends.207 And in January 2015, she filed for and received an ex parte temporary
SAPO in civil court.208 At the hearing that had been scheduled to consider whether
to issue a final order, the trial court instead reviewed its decision on the temporary
protection order and, based on Roake’s SAPO petition, granted Delman’s motion to
dismiss, finding it unnecessary to decide the disputed issue of whether a sexual
assault ever actually occurred, and instead denying Roake’s petition solely because
of her failure to adequately allege a fear of future harm.209 The Court of Appeals
reversed, understanding the decision to be about a final order, not an ex parte
temporary order, and noting the inconsistency in the statute “by focusing on the
language of the final order statute . . . which . . . read in isolation . . . does not
reference ‘a reasonable fear of future dangerous acts.’”210
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed the decision of the Court of Appels
and dismissed the temporary protection order, holding that a petitioner cannot obtain
an ex parte temporary order requiring her purported attacker to stay away unless she
alleges the existence of specific facts, other than the alleged assault itself, that
establish a reasonable fear of future harm.211 The concurring opinion asserted that
such a requirement applies not only to ex parte temporary orders, but also to final
orders, and observed that the legislature specifically intended for the SAPO statute
to “protect against future harms, not remedy past ones,” and further noted that “the
statutory requirement of future harm [was] unique among [Washington’s] protection

court shall issue a sexual assault protection order.” WASH. REV. CODE § 7.90.020 (2019).
However, Section 7.90.020 requires petitioners to allege both “the existence of
nonconsensual sexual contact” and “the specific facts and circumstances from which relief
is sought.” Id.
203
Roake v. Delman, 408 P.3d 658, 659 (Wash. 2018).
204
Id. at 659.
205
Id.
206
Id. After a one-month investigation, police “declined to prosecute.” Id. at 663
(McCloud, J. concurring).
207
Id. at 660 (Johnson, J. majority).
208
Id. at 659–60.
209
See id. at 660–62; id. at 661 n.5 (noting that the trial court “did not reach or resolve
the issue raised concerning the claim of sexual assault”); id. at 670 (Stephens, J., dissenting)
(“In this case the trial court dismissed Roake’s petition without determining whether she was
assaulted by Delman.”).
210
Id. at 660–61 (Johnson, J. majority).
211
Id. at 662–63.
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order statutes.”212 Because Ms. Roake “alleged no acts or statements separate from
the [alleged] sexual assault itself” and could not predict “what Delman might do in
the future,” she simply was not entitled to protective relief.213
In dissent, Justice Debra Stephens offered a compelling rebuttal to this “future
harm” requirement, explaining that such a requirement “ignores the reality that
experiencing a sexual assault is itself a reasonable basis for ongoing fear. . . . [T]he
statutory text does not require a petition to restate the obvious – that the petitioner is
reasonably afraid of the attacker in light of the alleged sexual assault.”214 She also
offered a practical justification for not requiring proof of future harm: to keep the
“SAPO petition process . . . straightforward and accessible to survivors, many of
whom seek judicial relief without legal assistance.”215 Offering evidence regarding
a single particular encounter is far more “straightforward” for the pro per litigant
than offering evidence to predict a likelihood of future contact, abuse, and assault
from an assailant.216
C. Burdens of Proof
The debate over the appropriate burden of proof in civil sexual assault
adjudications has grown more visible, vocal, and political.217 As disturbing statistics
about sexual assault on college campuses garnered national media attention in 2009
and 2010, the Obama administration’s Department of Education issued guidance in
2011 to university presidents for appropriately responding to allegations of sexual
assault.218 Among other things, the 2011 “Dear Colleague Letter” recommended
using a “preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof in administrative
212

Id. at 665–67 (McCloud, J. concurring). Judge McCloud also observed that “it is
absurd to interpret the SAPO language to require allegation of an element of future harm that
need not ever be proved.” Id. at 668.
213
Id. at 668.
214
Roake, 408 P.3d at 669–71 (Stephens, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, this approach invites
absurd results: if the assault itself cannot form the basis of a required showing, any petition
based on a single assault by an unknown assailant would be legally insufficient, though this
is exactly the type of assault the SAPO Act is meant to address.”).
215
Id. at 669–70 (Stephens, J., dissenting) (“streamlined requirements [is] in keeping
with the Legislature’s intent to make the SAPO process accessible.”).
216
Id.
217
John Villasenor & Nancy Cantalupo, Is a Higher Standard Needed for Campus
Sexual Assault Cases?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate
/2017/01/04/is-a-higher-standard-needed-for-campus-sexual-assault-cases [https://perma.cc
/E73K-4QSU] (consisting of a debate between Professor Nancy Chi Cantalupo of Barry
University School of Law and Professor John Villasenor of the University of California, Los
Angeles department of public policy regarding the efficacy and fairness of a preponderance
versus a clear and convincing standard); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
218
See DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: SEXUAL VIOLENCE, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Apr. 4,
2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/UT67-X35C].
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hearings.219 In 2017, President Trump’s Department of Education rescinded this
letter, replacing it with temporary guidelines providing significantly more
protections for the accused.220 One such protection for the accused was the
recommendation that universities use a heightened “clear and convincing evidence”
standard.221
The debate rages in the Title IX context but has largely been settled in civil
court. Twenty-six of twenty-eight SAPO jurisdictions require proof of past violence
or harassment by a preponderance of the evidence or similar burden.222 This burden
is “tailored to address the unique needs of sexual assault victims . . . reflect[ing] the
relative lack of extrinsic evidence in most cases and the need to provide an attainable
form of relief for victims in need.”223 As one court explained in the context of
domestic violence, “a clear-and-convincing standard would saddle victims . . . with
a burden that would often foreclose relief in many deserving cases.”224 Moreover,
even a lower preponderance standard requires some probable showing that sexual

219

Id. at 10–11.
2017 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 31.
221
See id. at 1 (criticizing 2011 Dear Colleague Letter’s requirement that schools “adopt
a minimal standard of proof—the preponderance of the evidence standard— . . . even though
many schools had traditionally employed a higher clear and convincing evidence standard”);
see also id. at 1–2 (“The 2011 . . . guidance document[] may have been well-intentioned, but
those documents have led to the deprivation of rights for many students . . . .”). The National
Center for Higher Education Risk Management (NCHERM) recommended to schools in
2001 that they use the preponderance of the evidence standard in sexual misconduct hearings.
BRETT A. SOKOLOW, NATIONAL SEXUAL VIOLENCE RESOURCE CENTER, COMPREHENSIVE
SEXUAL MISCONDUCT JUDICIAL PROCEDURES 1, 20 (2001), https://www.ncherm.org/pdfs/
COMPREHENSIVE_CAMPUS_SEXUAL_MISCONDUCT_JUDICIAL_PROCEDURES
.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9BX-RY3R]. The NCHERM criticized the “clear and convincing
evidence” standard for acting as a structural impediment for alleged victims. A structural
impediment exists when “some aspect(s) of a college’s sexual assault policies . . . non-user
friendly.” Id. at 5. This rationale begs the question: who is the user? Presumably both
petitioner and respondent are school students, and the respondent accused of sexual
misconduct likely would find a higher burden of proof very “user-friendly.”
222
See infra Table 2. Some state statutes are silent on the burden of proof, but courts
interpreting those statutes have required a preponderance standard. See, e.g., Weismuller v.
Polston, 2012-Ohio-1476, 6–7 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012) (“[I]f the legislature had wanted to
require clear and convincing evidence, it would have specified that standard . . . .”);
Marquette v. Marquette, 1984 OK 25, 686 P.2d 991, 993–94 (Okla. Civ. App. 1984) (finding
that actions under Oklahoma’s civil protection order statutes are “civil, not criminal” and the
proper standard is “preponderance of the evidence”).
223
Fields, supra note 7, at 489 (contending that a higher burden of proof might be
justified for orders infringing on fundamental constitutional rights, such as orders requiring
the relinquishment of firearms).
224
Crespo v. Crespo, 972 A.2d 1169, 1177 (rejecting “a burden of persuasion that more
effectively eliminates the chance of a mistaken adjudication at the steep price of permitting
countless more meritorious claims to be lost”).
220
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assault occurred, a fact often obscured in the debate over “he said/she said”
adjudications.225
But even if a preponderance standard governs proof of past sexual assault,
should it govern the independent proof of future harm? Of the thirteen states
requiring independent proof of future harm, six require proof by a preponderance,
two require proof of “substantial fear” or “imminent fear” by a preponderance, two
require proof by clear and convincing evidence, two require a “reasonable belief” of
future harm, and Florida requires a genuine fear of imminent harm.226 Thus, only
three states tie the fear of future harm to the actual beliefs of the victim; ten states
requiring objective proof that it is at least more likely than not a victim will suffer a
future act of abuse.227
III. ASYLUM LAW AND “PROOF” OF FUTURE HARM
As the foregoing Section illustrates, the ability of sexual violence victims to
“prove” future harm depends on several factors: the past conduct of the assailant,
the likelihood of future contact with the assailant; and the definition of “harm,” and
the burden of proof employed.228 Of course, no one can definitively “prove” that a
particular individual will harm another individual in the future. At best, the law can
make predictions of future contact based on past behavior, including past
misconduct, past interactions, and evidence demonstrating a future likelihood of one
or both. SAPO statutes have struck an uneven and often unjustified balance between
providing attainable relief for sexual violence victims and requiring some objective
predictive measure of future harm.
The few scholars addressing SAPO legislation have analogized sexual violence
to domestic violence as a way to justify flexible protection procedures, noting the
similarity between domestic and sexual violence as private, intimate acts of (mostly)
“gender-based violence.”229 But this analogy fails in the context of future harm.
Courts and legislatures considering DVRO applications presume future harm to the
petitioner upon a showing of past harm precisely because of the relationship status
of the parties making DVRO relief available. The parties are, or at some point were
partners with significant close contact, and this definitional partnership created at
least a rebuttable presumption of future contact and harm. No such relationship
necessarily exists in sexual violence cases, so a simple analogy to another form of
gender-based violence alone cannot justify similar presumptions in the SAPO
context.
225

See Adorno v. Melvin, 876 F.3d 917, 920 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[P]reponderance of the
evidence, if you look at this like a scale, all you have to do is tilt it. So the definition of
preponderance of the evidence is, it’s more likely than not that the event occurred.”).
226
See infra Table 2.
227
Id.
228
As to “harm,” the distinction for SAPO legislation appears to be whether one must
prove a likelihood of the same type of harm in the future (i.e., another sexual assault) or a
likelihood of a more generalized harm.
229
See Jodoin, supra note 17, at 115–16.
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But another protection order regime can more easily justify a rebuttable
presumption of future harm for sexual violence victims: asylum law. This analogy
seems strange at first blush. Asylum is neither a “protection order” in the traditional
sense nor designed to restrain the actions of the perpetrator. Asylum protections also
are not predicated on sexual or gender-based violence. But as this Section illustrates,
asylum does contain the paradigmatic hallmarks of a protection order regime. More
importantly, asylum protections are predicated on proof of a very restrictive form of
“atrocious discrimination” or “persecution” that both parallels with the narrowly
defined heinous crime of sexual violence and justifies rebuttable presumptions of
future harm.230
A. The Asylum Protection Order Paradigm
It is important to consider how asylum law can legitimately be viewed as a form
of protection order, given the novelty of the claim and the lack of a respondent to be
formally restrained.231 Asylum laws function to grant refuge to victims of abuse from
their assailants by allowing them to live in a new country free from contact with the
persecuting home country.232 While the procedures are flipped – immigration courts
grant protective space to victims who have already fled their abusers, while civil
courts grant protection orders requiring abusers to stay away from their victims –
the purpose remains the same: to grant the space necessary for future healing.
Indeed, asylum law functions to (1) address a widespread humanitarian crisis;
(2) protecting a discrete and vulnerable population; (3) suffering profound mental,
physical, and emotional anguish; (4) that is likely to continue absent intervention;
and (5) that which existing legal structures have failed to prevent; by (6) affording
the victim agency to direct the course of protection.233
230

See Saleem v. Mukasey, 289 F. App’x 452, 454 (2d Cir. 2008).
The persecuting foreign government cannot be hailed into United States immigration
court to answer for its persecution, but it can be implicitly “restrained” from future contact
with the asylum seeker, should it attempt to continue its persecution in the United States.
232
Arlene Kanter & Kristin Dadey, The Right to Asylum for People with Disabilities,
73 TEMP. L. REV. 1117, 1143 (2000) (explaining that the asylum paradigm was not created
“to address past persecution of social groups, but rather to prevent future persecution”);
Hannah Pearce, An Examination of the International Understanding of Political Rape and
the Significance of Labeling It Torture, 14 INT’L. J. REFUGEE L. 534, 552 (2002) (“[A]sylum
is clearly not a reward for past persecution but a mechanism to prevent future
persecution . . . .”).
233
See Union of Refugee Women and Others v. Director: Private Security Industry
Regulatory Authority and Others, 2006 (4) SA 395 (CC) at 59 para. 117 (S. Afr.)
(“[R]efugees as a group are by definition vulnerable.”); Hawaii v. Trump, 871 F.3d 646, 662
(9th Cir. 2017) (recognizing refugees as a “marginalized and vulnerable” population). As to
the lack of adequate remedies, refugees by definition have no adequate remedy in their
country of origin because the persecution to which they are subjected is perpetrated or
allowed by the government, the very entity responsible for providing legal remedies.
231
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Refugee protections first arose in response to a widespread humanitarian crisis
facing Europe in the aftermath of World War II.234 Millions of people had been
displaced to foreign countries as a result of specific discrimination or generalized
violence, and by 1951 it became clear that many of these people were unlikely ever
to go home.235 Contemporaneous accounts of these displaced persons suggest that
the horrors of war and the atrocities of persecution had so permanently scarred these
individuals that they simply could not ever feel safe in their home country again,
regardless of the changing circumstances in their home country.236
In response, dozens of countries gathered in 1951 to address the crisis.237 What
resulted from the conference was the creation of an asylum protection regime, both
“aspirational” in purpose and limited in scope.238 While “reluctan[t] to commit
themselves to large future obligations,”239 the countries agreed to protect a discrete
class of displaced persons particularly vulnerable to mistreatment because of their
difference from the dominant community on account of their “race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.”240
Scholars debate whether the limited definition of refugee is merely a necessary limitsetting device on an admittedly “expansive goal”241 or a betrayal of the “core purpose
of the refugee definition – protection against the persecution of difference, group
234

Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Migration Emergencies, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 609, 635 (2017)
(“The drafters of the Refugee Convention, working under the specter of mass influx, treated
the issue as a scary basement to which the door must remain firmly shut. In the wake of
World War II, more than 850,000 displaced persons were living in camps for displaced
persons in Austria, Germany, and Italy.”).
235
T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 789 (8th ed. West 2016).
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Megan Heesch, Navigating the Doctrinal Tension in U.S. Asylum Law, 25 MINN. J.
INT’L L. 421, 457–58 (2016); see also Ramji-Nogales, supra note 234, at 636–37 (articulating
a historical narrative of the Refugee Convention drafting process that cynically “stamped out
any suggestion that the Refugee Convention might offer means of entry into a state”).
239
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 235, at 789. In some ways, this approach worked.
The narrow definition of refugee, discussed below, excludes many of the estimated 58
million people currently seeking asylum outside their home countries or living in “refugeelike” situations as internally displaced persons in their home country. See id. at 790 (“Some
of the largest concentrations of refugee populations (as they are popularly understood) . . .
consist primarily of people who fled civil war and ethnic strife,” not targeted persecution.);
see also Ramji-Nogales, supra note 234, at 637 (Emphasizing the limited individualized
purpose of the Refugee Convention: “the drafters firmly closed the door to protection-based
approaches to processing large groups of migrants and to enabling them safe passage for
migrants fleeing harm.”).
240
UN 1951 Convention, supra note 27; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
Art. 1(A)(2), Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6233, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; see also Refugee Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (implementing the UN 1951 Convention).
241
Heesch, supra note 238, at 457.
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guilt, and the suppression of belief and expression.”242 But regardless of the
particularized values sought to be protected by the asylum protection paradigm,
indisputably the overriding purpose of the law is the prospective protection of the
person.
This limitation on who may qualify for protection evokes similarities to the
limited purpose of SAPO legislation. Asylum laws protect only those in a discrete
and particularly vulnerable class, not all people who suffer from generalized
violence or insecurity. While “[n]arratives of flight from persecution or war evoke
sympathetic images of refugees,” protection is usually reserved “for those who meet
a specific legal definition.”243 Similarly, SAPO statutes are not available to anyone
who has suffered generalized harassment or even some forms of sexual harassment,
but a specifically-defined form of sexual violence typically set forth in a state’s
criminal code.244
The refugee definition also limits the types of harm qualifying one for
protection to the type of profound and all-encompassing injury paradigmatic of
protection orders. Not all mistreatment qualifies one for asylum protection. The
1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and Sections
207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act provide asylum protection only to those
who have a well-founded fear of “persecution.”245 Neither U.S. nor international law
242

Daniel J. Steinbock, Interpreting the Refugee Definition, 45 UCLA L. REV. 733,
781, 787–88, 804 (1998) (articulating various proposed purposes of the refugee definition,
including “[r]emediation of the failure of state protection . . . protection against serious harm
inflicted on account of personal status . . . protection against the infliction of collective
punishment . . . [and] the privileging of individual belief and expression”).
243
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 235, at 789. The United States, as with many
countries around the world, only grants refugee status to those who arrive at its border or
who are already inside the country and can demonstrate they meet the narrow definition
adopted by Article 1(A)(2) of the UN 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees:
[T]he term “refugee” shall apply to any person who . . . owing to a well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country.
See UN 1951 Convention, supra note 27; Refugee Act of 1980 § 102.
244
See supra Section II.
245
See UN 1951 Convention, supra note 27; Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1157(a) (2012); Molina v. Whitaker, 910 F.3d 1056, 1060 (8th Cir. 2018) (affirming denial
of asylum application because the applicant alleged “no well-founded fear of future
persecution . . .”); Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 148–49 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding BIA’s
denial of asylum application where applicant presented no well-founded fear of future
persecution, but only adverse treatment arising from enforcement in home country “because
the record did not contain persuasive evidence . . . amounting to persecution” (quoting In re
J-H-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 196 (BIA 2007))).
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defines persecution,246 but courts have emphasized that “mere discrimination or
harassment” does not qualify.247 The Ninth Circuit explained in Ghaly v. INS248 that
“‘persecution’ is . . . ‘the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ . . .
in a way regarded as offensive,’” but that “persecution is an extreme concept that
does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.”249
The core definition of “persecution” includes extreme physical violence,
including physical torture and illegitimate imprisonment.250 But the outer bands of
the definition are narrow. Even extreme non-physical discrimination does not
amount to persecution unless it “threatens the person’s very life or liberty.”251 In
defining the outer limits of “persecution,” the Fourth Circuit held in Mirisawo v.
Holder that a claim of economic deprivation could amount to “persecution” only if
the claimed abuses amounted to “a deliberate and severe deprivation of
necessities.”252 Applying this definition, the court denied a Zimbabwe national’s
claims of political persecution when members of President Robert Mugabe’s
government bulldozed three of the four rooms in a new home she had purchased for
her brother and family, because the home was not completely destroyed and because
Ms. Mirisawo had never lived or planned to personally live in the home.253

246

Melaj v. Mukasey, 282 F. App’x 354, 358 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The Immigration and
Nationalization Act (“INA”) provides no definition of ‘persecution,’ and thus far this Court
has declined to articulate one.” (citing Mikhailevitch v. I.N.S., 146 F.3d 384, 389 (6th Cir.
1998))); JAMES HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 7 (1st ed.
1991) (describing the 1951 Convention’s lack of a clear definition for “persecution” and
contending that the omission was deliberate to allow Western states broad latitude in defining
categories of ideological dissidents over whom to grant protection).
247
Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1133 (7th Cir. 1992) (contrasting discrimination
or harassment with threat of death); see also Lamaj v. Mukasey, 275 F. App’x 522, 527 (6th
Cir. 2008) (“The INA provides no definition of ‘persecution.’ This court, however, has
determined that ‘persecution’ . . . requires more than a few isolated incidents of verbal
harassment or intimidation . . . .”).
248
58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339 (9th
Cir. 1995); Fisher v. INS, 37 F.3d 1371, 1380 (9th Cir. 1994)).
249
Id. at 1431 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Scott Rempell, Defining
Persecution, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 283, 337 (2013) (“When legislators debated whether to
include a definition of persecution in the Refugee Act, they ultimately declined to do so under
the premise that the Ninth Circuit’s description of persecution was well established.”).
250
See Lolong v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1215, 1220 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2005) (It is not the case
“that only killings or extreme violence constitute persecution” for the purposes of asylum
applications. “Rather . . . discrimination and harassments, in combination with lower levels
of violence, may also constitute persecution.”).
251
Mirisawo v. Holder, 599 F.3d 391, 396 (4th Cir. 2010).
252
Id. at 396 (emphasis added). The court emphasized that “not every economic
deprivation or disadvantage makes a person a ‘refugee.’” Id.
253
Id. at 402. In a stirring dissent, Judge Gregory posited a hypothetical whereby a
political dissident spent $1,000 to build a well that was immediately poisoned upon
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Mirisawo highlights the limited scope of the asylum protection paradigm.
Although the destruction of Ms. Mirisawo’s home was almost surely a human rights
violation,254 asylum law is not designed to afford relocation to all who have suffered
such violations.255 The development of asylum law in the United States points to an
intent to protect a narrower class of persons whose life on return would be so
constricted as to be virtually impossible in their home country.256 This narrow
qualifying definition of “persecution” is critical to the sexual violence analogy. Both
persecution as narrowly defined and sexual violence as defined in criminal codes are
“atrocious,” “heinous” forms of injury that create uniquely long-lasting future
harms.257 As discussed infra, it is precisely for this reason that immigration courts
require neither proof of multiple past acts of persecution nor independent proof of a
future likelihood of harm.
Asylum contains the other hallmarks of a protection order paradigm. It
predicates relief on a “well-founded fear” of future harm absent intervention, even
if a rebuttable presumption of future harm exists in certain cases. 258 Moreover,
asylum fills the gap where existing legal structures fail. The persecution experienced
by asylum seekers must have been perpetrated either by their home country’s
government or by non-state actors “where it is shown that the government of the
proposed country of [return] is unwilling or unable to control that group.”259 Thus,
any existing legal recourse in their home country would prove fruitless. And asylum
provides agency to asylum seekers by allowing them to direct the course of their
protection.260

completion, and asked “would this Court hold that merely because the alien had yet to drink
from the well, he was not persecuted?” Id. at 402 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
See, e.g., id.; cf. Borca v. INS, 77 F.3d 210, 217 (7th Cir. 1996) (reaffirming that,
“[t]o establish a well-founded fear of economic persecution, [an asylum applicant] must
show that she faces a probability of deliberate imposition of substantial economic
disadvantage on account of her political opinion,” but overturning agency holding that
required economic persecution to be “so severe as to deprive an applicant of all means of
earning their living”); cf. Koval v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 798, 805–06 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding
economic persecution where the government of Ukraine prevented a Mormon from
“continuing her education in the Ph.D. physics program, denied her permission to live in
Kiev and reduced her to working in menial jobs that required no education, training or
acuity”).
257
Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 19 (BIA 1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.90.020 (2019).
258
See Jerez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 286 F. App’x 796, 798 (3d Cir. 2008) (denying
asylum application despite “subjective belief that guerillas were still active in Guatemala”
because she failed to “prove a well-founded fear of future persecution” (citing GomezZuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 345 (3d Cir. 2008))).
259
McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1319 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981).
260
See Natalie Nanasi, Domestic Violence Asylum and the Perpetuation of the
Victimization Narrative, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 756 (2017).
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Having established a framework for the SAPO/asylum law analogy, the balance
of this Part turns to how asylum law assesses its “future harm” requirement and
whether that assessment can inform sexual violence protection orders. The refugee
definition is inherently prospective, offering relief only to those who can
demonstrate a “well-founded fear” of future persecution. The same questions of
proof exist in this context. How can one demonstrate a fear of future harm? Must a
pattern of past acts be demonstrated to predict future behavior? And by what
standard must one “prove” future harm?
B. Single Acts of Abuse
Unlike most SAPO statutes, asylum applicants need not prove that they have
actually suffered past persecution to qualify for relief; demonstrating a “wellfounded fear” of future persecution will suffice.261 This approach accords with the
logic of protection order regimes, which are inherently prospective and should
provide relief when reasonable grounds exist to suggest a likelihood of future harm.
In this sense, asylum law acts like a more rational prospective protection order
statute than do most SAPO statutes. States would be well served to explicitly define
“future harm” alone as a qualifying ground for a sexual violence protection order,
which would align more closely with the stated goal of providing forward-looking
protection for victims.
Of course, demonstrating a likelihood of future harm without any past record
of abuse (even a single incident) will prove more difficult for both asylum and sexual
violence victims, and no “rebuttable presumption” of future harm should exist in
those situations because no likelihood of future harm can be presumed in the absence
of any past harm.262 No such presumption exists in asylum law, nor should one exist
in SAPO statutes.
However, many asylum applicants petition on the basis of having already
suffered a past act of persecution. These applicants enjoy a rebuttable presumption
of future harm based on this past record of abuse, as discussed in more detail infra,
in Section C. Importantly, these applicants need not demonstrate a “course of
conduct” via multiple past acts of persecution to qualify for such a presumption or
otherwise to qualify for asylum; rather, one incident suffices.

261

See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 235, at 821 (“[T]here is no requirement that
applicants for protection under the asylum and withholding statutes have already suffered
past persecution . . . .”); Paramanathan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 341 F. App’x 613, 616 (11th Cir.
2009) (“To establish asylum eligibility, an applicant must show with specific and credible
evidence (1) past persecution . . . or (2) a well-founded fear [of] . . . future persecution”
(quoting Zheng v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 451 F.3d 1287, 1290 (11th Cir. 2006))).
262
This statement recognizes that sufficiently specific threats may themselves
constitute past abuse in certain circumstances.
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C. Rebuttable Presumption of Future Harm
As noted above, no requirement exists that applicants for asylum protection
prove they have already suffered past persecution.263 However, many applicants
have suffered such past harm. In the United States, these applicants are the
beneficiaries of an express rebuttable presumption that they have a well-founded
fear of future persecution.264 The regulations specify that applicants who establish
that they were subject to persecution on one of the protected grounds in the past will
be presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution.265 The government can
rebut this presumption in two ways: (1) by showing that a fundamental change in
circumstances has occurred that removes any well-founded fear of persecution; or
(2) by showing that the asylum applicant could avoid future persecution by
relocating to another part of the home country and that it would be reasonable to
expect the applicant to do so.266
This rebuttable presumption standard was not the initial product of legislative
action; the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) introduced the standard in 1989 in
Matter of Chen.267 In articulating the standard, the BIA observed that “a rebuttable
presumption arises [when] an alien who has been persecuted in the past by his
country’s government has reason to fear similar persecution in the future.”268 In the
text of the decision, the BIA hinted at its rationale behind the creation of this new
standard:
It is frequently recognized that a person who – or whose family – has
suffered under atrocious forms of persecution should not be expected to
repatriate. Even though there may have been change of regime in his
country, this may not always produce a complete change in the attitude of
the population, nor, in view of his past experiences, in the mind of the
refugee. 269

263

See Xusheng Shi v. Bd.of Immigration Appeals, 374 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 2004)
(explaining that an applicant can demonstrate asylum status by showing either that he has
suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution).
264
Ming Dai v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 858, 867 (9th Cir. 2018) (“If a noncitizen establishes
past persecution, a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear arises, and the burden shifts
to the government to demonstrate that there has been a fundamental change in circumstances
such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear.” (citing Tawadus v. Ashcroft, 364
F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004))).
265
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2018).
266
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)-(B) (2018); Tawadrus, 364 F.3d at 1102–03 (9th Cir.
2004).
267
Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16.
268
Id.
269
Id. at 19.
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Congress adopted this “rebuttable presumption” standard seven years later in
1996, codifying a refugee-friendly doctrine in the otherwise draconian and
unfortunately named Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996.270 Notably, no legislative history exists to explain why Congress
incorporated the rebuttable presumption standard. It appears the holding and
rationale of Matter of Chen was adopted wholesale with virtually no legislative
discussion.271
But the rationale articulated in Matter of Chen contains clues. In particular,
there appears to be a reasonableness component with both objective and subjective
elements. The BIA created this rebuttable presumption at least in part because it
simply would not be reasonable to “expect[]” those who suffer “atrocious forms of
persecution . . . to repatriate,” suggesting that at least some forms of egregious past
persecution are sufficient for asylum status.272 One can glean an objective
reasonableness prong from the court’s observation that circumstances on the ground
may not have sufficiently changed in fact to merit returning an asylum seeker to her
home country. But importantly, the court suggests a rebuttable presumption ought
to exist even if conditions in the home country have objectively changed, so long as
the “mind of the refugee” has not changed, given her traumatic experience.273
Thus, the rebuttable presumption standard appears “principally designed to
protect a victim of persecution from even the remote possibility of future
persecution.”274 Indeed, the BIA’s preoccupation with the asylum seeker’s
subjective perception of future harm suggests a paramount “concern for the
persecution victim’s state of mind and the desire that a victim of persecution not be
forced to relive her persecution in the place where the persecution occurred.”275 This
concern with the subjective state of mind of “atrocious persecution” victims may
270

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-649 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012)).
271
See Shelley M. Hall, Quixotic Attempt? The Ninth Circuit, the BIA, and the Search
for a Human Rights Framework to Asylum Law, 73 WASH. L. REV. 105, 124–125 (1998)
(remarking on the rebuttable presumption standard articulated in Chen and observing that
“[t]he legislative history of [IIRIRA] provides little, if any, interpretive help . . . ,” because
“[t]he asylum deadlines and summary exclusion procedures in the bill received the most
attention in floor debates and in commentaries because those are the most obviously onerous
provisions” (citations omitted)).
272
Lal v. INS, 255 F.3d 998, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (“It is
frequently recognized that a person who—or whose family—has suffered under atrocious
forms of persecution should not be expected to repatriate.” (quoting Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec.
at 18–19)).
273
Id. (“[C]hanged country conditions ‘may not always produce a complete
change . . . in view of his past experiences, in the mind of the refugee.’” (quoting Chen, 20
I. & N. Dec. at 18–19)).
274
Timothy P. McIlmail, Toward a More Reasonably Rebutted Presumption: A
Proposal to Amend the “Past Persecution” Asylum Regulation – 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(B)(1),
12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 265, 271 (1998).
275
Id.
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also help explain the former Immigration and Naturalization Service’s decision to
adopt implementing regulations allowing a “humanitarian grant of asylum” for
victims of past persecution even in the absence of fears of future persecution: “[a]n
applicant . . . may be granted asylum, in the exercise of the decision-maker’s
discretion, if . . . the applicant has demonstrated compelling reasons for being
unwilling . . . to return . . . arising out of the severity of the past persecution.”276
The rationale for a rebuttable presumption—that it is unreasonable to force a
victim of “severe” and “atrocious” past abuse to return to the place of that abuse—
applies with equal force to sexual violence. Rape and sexual assault are among the
most intimate, violative, abusive, and degrading forms of physical abuse. Rape is
treated as the most serious violent offense in our criminal code other than murder,
making it the most serious offense for which a person could seek a protection
order.277 In the same way that asylum law will not force adjudicated victims of severe
past persecution to face renewed trauma by returning to the location of the abuse,
SAPO statutes should not force adjudicated victims of sexual violence to face
renewed trauma by continued interactions with their assailants.
There is another, equally compelling way to interpret asylum law’s rebuttable
presumption standard that aligns with the experience of sexual violence. Under the
BIA’s rationale from Matter of Chen, it would be objectively unreasonable to expect,
“in view of his past experience, . . . the mind of the [persecuted] refugee” to change
sufficiently to deny the future harm he likely would suffer upon a forced return.278
In other words, the enduring violence of severe persecution forever changes the mind
and heart of the persecuted, and the law is willing to recognize this ongoing harm as
an objectively reasonable basis upon which to grant prospective relief. Precisely the
same argument can and should be made for sexual violence victims, who endure
continued suffering long after the attack even when the likelihood of another attack
seems remote.
Of course, the nature of rebuttable presumptions is that they can be rebutted. In
asylum law, once past persecution has been established, the burden shifts to the
government to show “by a preponderance of the evidence, either: (1) a change in the
country’s conditions; or (2) that relocation within the country would avoid future

276

8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A) (2019).
See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003,
95 J CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 529 n.13 (2005) (examining exonerations for various
offenses and coding offenses based on state law punishments on “the following descending
scale: murder, rape, other violent crimes, non-violent crimes”); Stuart Ford, The Meaning of
Gravity at the International Criminal Court: A Survey of Attitudes About the Seriousness of
Mass Atrocities, 24 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 209, 235 (2018) (surveying participants
to rate “the most grave” offenses based on a hypothetical scenario: 40% scored the scenario
involving murder as the most grave, 22% said murder and rape were “equally grave,” 15%
found rape to be “the most serious offense,” and “almost nobody (2%) thought that [nonrape] assault was the most serious crime”).
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Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 19.
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persecution and that it was reasonable to expect the alien to do so.”279 The corollary
to sexual violence would require a showing by the respondent that either: (1) the
assailant has changed sufficiently to warrant continued contact with his victim; or
(2) that it would be reasonable to require the victim, rather than the assailant, to
relocate.
As to (1), it would, of course, be incredibly difficult to demonstrate in the
immediate aftermath of an attack that a perpetrator had “changed” sufficiently to
negate a reasonable fear of future harm. But even if significant time had passed since
the attack, and even if the assailant had rehabilitated, the mere presence of an
attacker acts as a significant triggering event for sexual violence victims regardless
of the motivations of the assailant.280 As to (2), no law could credibly suggest a
remedy requiring the victim to move away from the attacker as a form of protection,
at least not one grounded in a sense of fairness and justice. Indeed, under this
approach, the only types of “change[s] in . . . conditions” sufficient to rebut a
presumption of future harm in the sexual violence context would appear to be the
assailant’s incarceration or incapacitation.
And in fact, the presumption of future harm has proven nearly that difficult to
rebut in the asylum context. For example, in Kataria v. INS,281 the petitioner
established past persecution in his native India based on his political affiliations with
the All India Sikh Student Federation, a group “seeking the establishment of the
independent Sikh state of Khalistan.”282 Having established past persecution, Mr.
Kataria enjoyed a presumption of future harm, which the government attempted to
rebut with substantial country conditions evidence demonstrating that the number of
documented acts of persecution against this political minority “ha[d] declined
significantly.”283 The Ninth Circuit did not dispute this evidence but found it “not
sufficient to rebut the presumption” of future harm.284
279

See id. at 17–19; see also Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 2004).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Knezevic v. Ashcroft recognized that
internal relocation to a safer area within an applicant’s country can constitute a change in
circumstances sufficient to overcome the presumption of future persecution. The court
further stated, “the reasonableness of internal relocation is determined by considering
whether the applicant would face other serious harm in the place of suggested relocation;
any ongoing civil strife; administrative, economic, or judicial infrastructure; geographical
limitations; and social and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social and
family ties.” Id. (citing C.F.R. § 1208.12(b)(3)). Thus, even if the conditions of various
regions within an applicant’s country would justify a grant of asylum, if a particular region
is deemed suitable for relocation, the presumption can still be rebutted. This unquestionably
eases the burden for the government in certain situations.
280
See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, BROKEN BODIES, SHATTERED MINDS: TORTURE
AND ILL-TREATMENT OF WOMEN 16 (2001), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Document
s/120000/act400012001en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5J28-VGY4].
281
Kataria v. INS, 232 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).
282
Id. at 1109.
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Id. at 1115.
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The government also failed to rebut a past persecution presumption based on
perceived changes in country conditions in Alcius v. Holder.285 The petitioner, a
Haitian national and political activist affiliated with Jean Baptiste Aristide’s Lavalas
Party, was continually harassed by right-wing parliamentary groups during
Aristide’s exile from 1991 to 1994.286 At one point during this period, they were
detained, interrogated, and beaten at a prison for two days by these hostile groups.287
Alcius subsequently left Haiti in 1995.288 The immigration judge found Alcius’s past
persecution story credible, but found that the government had successfully rebutted
the presumption of future persecution by presenting evidence that a new political
party without a history of political persecution had taken control of the country.289
The Sixth Circuit reversed.290 Notably, while the Sixth Circuit agreed with the
government that Alcius’s original persecutors were no longer in power, it focused
on evidence of continued “human-rights abuses . . . in Haiti” against both “pro- and
anti-Aristide partisans.”291 This reluctance to rebut Alcius’s presumption of future
harm based primarily on the existence of unspecified non-governmental violence
illustrates how impenetrable the presumption has become.292
The government has also failed to rebut the presumption of future harm based
solely on a petitioner’s continued contacts with the country of origin. In Prus v.
Mukasey,293 a citizen of Uzbekistan, successfully demonstrated to the immigration
judge that he suffered past persecution on account of his religious beliefs.294 The
judge nonetheless rejected Prus’s asylum claim because the government
successfully rebutted Prus’s presumption of well-founded fear.295 In particular, the
government showed that Prus “returned to Uzbekistan three times without incident”
following his persecution and flight from the country, including returning at least
one time for a visa interview with government officials.296 The Ninth Circuit
reversed, observing that the government had neither provided evidence of changed
285

Alcius v. Holder, 374 F. App’x 583, 584 (6th Cir. 2010).
Id.
287
Id.
288
Id.
289
Id. at 586.
290
Id. at 591.
291
Id. at 588.
292
Lopez v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 799, 805 (9th Cir. 2004) (“If past persecution is shown,
the BIA cannot discount it merely on a say-so. Rather, our precedent establishes that in such
a case the BIA must provide an ‘individualized analysis of how changed conditions will
affect the specific petitioner’s situation.”); see also Hanna v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 933, 938–40
(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that evidence demonstrating “the fall of the Ba’ath party” in Iraq
was not sufficient to “remove[] any fear of future persecution” where petitioner was
persecuted by the Ba’ath party for his political affiliations).
293
Prus v. Mukasey, 289 F. App’x 973 (9th Cir. 2008).
294
Id. at 975.
295
Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)); Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir.
1998).
296
Id.
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circumstances in Uzbekistan or that Prus could reasonably be expected to relocate
to another part of the country safely.297 Moreover, the court noted that these
purportedly “voluntary” trips were taken “in a manner to avoid detection,” lasted
only a short period of time, and in at least one instance was taken at great personal
risk to visit his ill son in Ukraine.298
Significant future contact with the country of origin may rebut any claims of
future harm, however. In Male v. United States, a native-born citizen of Albania
sought asylum “based on his political opinion and his membership in the Albanian
Army.”299 But despite a finding of past persecution on these grounds, the court found
that the government had sufficiently rebutted a presumption of future harm.300 The
court noted that conditions in Albania had changed so fundamentally that the
petitioner’s family had lived openly and without harassment since the country’s
Democratic Party regained control, negating any suggestion that a likelihood of
future harm existed.301
These cases sketching the contours of asylum’s rebuttable presumption
standard are relevant in the sexual violence context. As in Kataria and Holder, postviolence conditions on the ground may substantially change for the better. An abuser
may go extended periods of time without contacting or harassing his victim, even
deliberately taking steps to avoid her. But this voluntary cessation of abuse provides
no more comfort to a victim of intimate sexual violence than it does to a victim of
severe persecution. Only a formal order of protection, buttressed by threat of
criminal sanction, can provide the sense of security necessary to rebuild one’s life
in the wake of such a traumatic violation.
Prus and Male are likewise instructive. A sexual violence victim may have little
choice but to interact with her assailant, either because they work in the same office,
are enrolled in the same class, or otherwise have intertwined schedules. But just as
it would be unreasonable to require Mr. Prus not to travel to Uzbekistan to visit his
sick child,302 it would be unreasonable to require sexual violence victims to leave
their jobs or schools to avoid their attackers. Some outer exceptions may exist, such
as voluntarily living or socializing with an assailant for twelve years, as in Male.303
But absent these and similar circumstances suggesting a subjective intent to remain
in contact voluntarily, a victim’s continued compelled interactions with her abuser
to maintain employment or enrollment should not be viewed as negating fear of
future harm.
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Id.
Id. The Court denied that these trips demonstrated Prus had a “safe haven” in
Ukraine, contrasting his case specifically with an Indonesian national who fled persecution
but then returned for two extended periods to live and work without incident.
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Male v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 399 F. App’x. 440, 441 (11th Cir. 2010).
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Id. at 442.
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Perhaps most analogous to the sexual violence experience is Mohammed v.
Gonzales.304 Khadija Ahmed Mohammed, a native and citizen of Somalia, applied
for asylum at the age of seventeen based in part on the fact that she had been
subjected to female genital mutilation (FGM) as a child, a type of horrific torture
that “rises to the level of persecution within the meaning of [] asylum law.”305
Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged she did not face any future risk of again
being mutilated, the court found that “genital mutilation, like forced sterilization, is
a ‘permanent and continuing’ act of persecution, which cannot constitute a change
in circumstances sufficient to rebut the presumption of a well-founded fear.”306 The
court further found that Ms. Mohammed would qualify for a “humanitarian” grant
of asylum even absent a well-founded fear of future harm, given that “female genital
mutilation is a particularly severe form of past persecution.”307
Like FGM, the intimate physical invasion of one’s body caused by sexual
violence serves as “a permanent and continuing act” of harm to its victims. While
FGM leaves permanent scars in a way that sexual violence (often) does not, the
permanent mental and emotional anguish felt by sexual violence victims deserves
recognition as sufficient for future harm purposes. To be sure, many actions meeting
the legal definition of “sexual assault” or “sexual harassment” constitute far less
severe forms of abuse than FGM, and it would be inappropriate to suggest that a
single act of groping exists on the same plane as “the cutting and removal of all or
some of a girl or a woman’s external genitalia.”308 But the similarities between the
physical, sexual, intimate violations of FGM and sexual assault, coupled with the
long-lasting psychological scarring of such an attack, render the analogy apt for the
limited purpose of justifying a rebuttable presumption of future harm.
D. “Well-Founded Fear” of Future Persecution
The question of burdens remains. If a presumption of future harm attaches to a
petitioner’s claim, the burden shifts to the respondent to rebut it. But if a presumption
does not attach—either because the petitioner has not established a past act of abuse
or because the statute precludes such a presumption—by what standard of proof
must the petitioner prove future harm? Unlike the majority of SAPO jurisdictions
which require proof of future harm by a preponderance of the evidence, an asylum
applicant need not prove by any standard that he will be or is likely to be
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persecuted.309 Instead, an applicant need only show “that a reasonable person in his
shoes would fear persecution.”310
In particular, to establish a “well-founded fear of future persecution, the
applicant must demonstrate that ‘(1) a reasonable person in the circumstances would
fear persecution; and (2) that the fear has some basis in reality of the circumstances
and is validated with specific, concrete facts.’”311 Neither the 1951 United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees nor the Immigration and Nationality
Act define “well-founded fear.”312 But the United States Supreme Court concluded
that “so long as an objective situation is established by the evidence, it need not be
shown that the situation will probably result in persecution, but it is enough that
persecution is a reasonable possibility.”313 The Court explained that this
interpretation is “consistent” with the United Nations “High Commissioner’s [for
Refugees] analysis of the United Nations’ standard,” which allows for a finding of
well-founded fear even if “an applicant only has a 10% chance of being shot,
tortured, or otherwise persecuted.”314
This approach makes sense, both in the asylum and the SAPO context. The
likely occurrence of a future event is immeasurably more difficult than proving the
existence of a past act. Given the seriousness of the future acts contemplated—
persecution and sexual assault—victims and potential victims should not be required
to prove it is more likely than not they will face this type of grave consequence, but
they should only be required to demonstrate that their concern about the potential
future act is grounded in objective fact. In this respect, asylum law also holds much
promise for SAPO reform.
CONCLUSION
All victims of violence suffer mental and emotional anguish following an
attack. However, sexual violence uniquely violates the sanctity, dignity, and safety
of victims, whose intimate physical violation creates deep and long-lasting feelings
of insecurity. Much of this insecurity stems from the “heinous” nature of the criminal
act itself. But for the majority of sexual violence victims who know and are
309
Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1133 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Nor must the applicant
for asylum prove that he will be persecuted.”).
310
Id. (“At argument we asked the government’s lawyer whether he would fear
persecution by Iran if he were in Bastanipour’s religious and political shoes and he conceded
that he would — and even conceded that he was a reasonable man! We accept both
concessions.”).
311
Huaman-Cornelio v. Bd. Immigration Appeals, 979 F.2d 995, 999 (4th Cir. 1992).
312
See UN 1951 Convention, supra note 27; Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1157(a) (2012).
313
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987); see also Mwesige v. Ashcroft,
59 F. App’x. 888, 893 (“[A]n applicant for asylum can establish a well-founded fear by
showing that a reasonable person in his or her circumstances would fear persecution . . . .”).
314
See Bastanipour, 980 F.2d at 1133 (“Nor must the applicant for asylum prove that
he will be persecuted—only that a reasonable person in his shoes would fear persecution.”).
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acquaintances with their attackers, genuine safety concerns exist when these victims
are forced to see and interact with their attackers at school, work, or in social
settings. Beyond the very real risk of a repeat assault, the mere presence of a violent
sexual perpetrator can trigger a uniquely devastating feeling of insecurity.
The failure of existing criminal justice structures to provide prospective relief
for these victims has led to a majority of jurisdictions adopting civil protection order
statutes authorizing limited prospective relief in the form of “stay away” orders
granting victims a measure of physical and emotional safety as they recover from
the traumatic experience. These restraining order mechanisms are an important step
in the right direction, but most such statutes treat sexual violence like any other
misconduct for which a plaintiff might seek an injunction. Given the prospective
nature of the relief, most of these statutes require some proof that a future attack is
likely to occur, and some states even require a showing that a similar sexual assault
is imminent. While such a showing might make sense in the context of a business
dispute or construction project, such a requirement in the sexual assault context
would create an evidentiary hurdle effectively eliminating civil protection order
relief for victims.
This Article has attempted to comprehensively catalog these “future harm”
evidentiary issues with existing SAPO legislation, provide normative and empirical
explanations for why these requirements fail to account for the uniqueness of sexual
assault, and provide a justification for a rebuttable presumption of future harm. The
parallels to asylum law—another body of law premised on “atrocious” violations of
one’s personhood— are instructive. As the national conversation regarding sexual
assault and acquaintance rape continues, and as states continue to grapple with
effective legal remedies for at-risk victims of sexual violence, perhaps reference to
the surprisingly similar asylum experience will result in the adoption of practical,
attainable, and justifiable evidentiary standards opening the door to civil protection
for more victims.
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Evolution of Civil Protection Orders
Year
“Catch-all” CPOs
2000315
2
2005316
6
317
2010
13
2015318
22
2019319
23

315

SAPOs
0
1
3
5
5

In 1980, California passed the first-in-the-nation restraining order statute offering
protection beyond relationship domestic abuse. See ch. 795 § 8, 1979 CAL. STAT. 2708. This
broad “catch-all” civil harassment restraining order remains California’s only civil protection
order mechanism for sexual violence victims in the state today. In 1993, North Dakota passed
its “disorderly conduct” civil restraining order statute. Act of Apr. 15, 1993, ch. 125 § 2,
1993 N.D. LAWS 556.
316
Between 2000 and 2005, four states passed “catch-all” restraining order statutes:
Montana in 2001, Oklahoma and Florida in 2003, and North Carolina in 2004. Uniform
Interstate Enforcement of Domestic Violence Protection Orders Act, ch. 223, 2001 MONT.
LAWS 1036; The Victim’s Freedom Act, ch. 2003-117, 2003 Fla. Laws 733 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 784.046; 2003 Okla. Sess. Laws. § 407 (enacted as OKLA STAT. tit. 22 § 60 (2003));
Act to Establish Civil No-Contact Orders for the Protection of Individuals Who Are Victims
of Unlawful Conduct, ch. 50C, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 768 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §
50C-11). Also in 2004, Illinois passed the first-in-the-nation Sexual Assault Protection Order
statute. 2004 Ill. Laws 1615 (codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. 22/101 et seq).
317
Between 2006 and 2010, seven more states passed “catch-all” restraining order
legislation: Alaska, Ohio and Vermont in 2006, South Dakota and Maine in 2007, and
Michigan and Massachusetts in 2010. Act of Aug. 16, 2006, ch. 36, 2004 Alaska Sess. Laws
1; Act Relating to Orders Against Stalking or Sexual Assault, No Contact Orders, and
Establishing A Victims’ Rights Study Committee, ch. 178 § 1, 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves
522; 2007 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 143 § 1, 209; 2006 Ohio Laws File 99; Act To Improve the
Protection from Abuse Laws, ch. 340, 2007 Me. Laws 860; 2010 Mich. Pub. Acts 21; 2010
Mass. Acts 71. During this time, two additional states passed SAPO legislation: Nevada in
2009, and Washington in 2010. 2009 NEV. STAT. 228; 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 103 (codified
at WASH. REV. CODE § 7.90.020).
318
Between 2011 and 2015, nine additional jurisdictions passed “catch-all” restraining
order legislation: Tennessee and the District of Columbia in 2011, Texas and Colorado in
2013, Virginia and Minnesota in 2014, and Connecticut, Maryland, and Wyoming in 2015.
18-377 D.C. REG. (June 3, 2011); 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts cmlxxxv; 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws
995; Act Relating to the Issuance of Protective Orders for Certain Sexual, Stalking, and
Trafficking Offenses, ch 520 §4, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 1417; 2014 Va. Acts 346; 2014 Minn.
Laws 204; 2015 Conn. Acts 258; 2012 Md. Laws 1; 2015 Wyo. Sess. Laws 144; . In addition,
Oregon passed a SAPO statute in 2014 (2013 c. 687 § 2 (effective Jan. 1, 2014)), followed
by Pennsylvania in 2015.
319
Most recently, Wisconsin passed a “catch-all” civil protection order in 2016. WIS.
STAT. § 813.12 (2016).
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Table 2. Proof Requirements for Sexual Assault Protection Orders
Course of Future
Future Harm
Overall Burden
Conduct? Harm?
Burden
Alaska320
No
No
Preponderance
California321
Yes
Yes
Clear and
Clear and
Convincing
Convincing
322
Colorado
No
Yes
Reasonable
Preponderance
Belief
Connecticut323
No
Yes
Reasonable
Preponderance
Belief
D.C.324
No
No
Reasonable
Grounds
Florida325
No
Yes
Genuinely Fears Silent
(and is likely
imminent)
326
Illinois
No
No
Preponderance
Maine327
No
Yes
Preponderance
Preponderance
Maryland328
No
Yes
Preponderance
Preponderance
(and is likely
imminent)
320
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.65.850 (West 2019) (requiring only proof that the
petitioner “is a victim of . . . sexual assault”).
321
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (West 2019) (defining “harassment” as a “course of
conduct composed of a series of acts of a period of time . . . evidencing a continuity of
purpose,” and authorizing grant of restraining order if “the judge finds by clear and
convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists” and is likely to continue).
322
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-103 (2018) (offering protection when “a minor child is
in danger in the reasonably foreseeable future of being the victim of an unlawful sexual
offense”).
323
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-16a(b) (2017) (“If the court finds that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the respondent has committed acts constituting [sexual assault] . . .
and will continue to commit such acts,” a permanent restraining order will issue.).
324
D.C. CODE § 16-1005 (2019) (enjoining respondent if there is good cause “to believe
the respondent has committed or threatened to commit a criminal offense against the
petitioner”).
325
FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (2019) (requiring proof that “petitioner genuinely fears repeat
violence by the respondent”).
326
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 22/103 (2010) (offering protection for any “victim of nonconsensual sexual conduct or non-consensual sexual penetration”).
327
ME. STAT. tit. 19-a, § 4006 (2017) (requiring proof of a past sexual assault by a
preponderance of the evidence).
328
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1505 (West 2019) (“If the judge finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the respondent has committed, and is likely to commit in
the future, an act [of sexual assault] . . . , the court may issue a final peace order to protect
the petitioner.”).
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Massachusetts329
Michigan330
Minnesota331
Montana332
Nevada333
North Carolina334
North Dakota335

No
No
No
No
No
No
No

No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No

Ohio336
Oklahoma337
Oregon338
Pennsylvania339
South Dakota340

No
No
No
No
No

No
No
Yes
Yes
No

329

Preponderance

Preponderance
Preponderance

[NO. 1
Silent
Silent
Preponderance
Good Cause
Preponderance
Preponderance
Reasonable
Grounds
Preponderance
Preponderance
Preponderance
Preponderance
Preponderance

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258E § 1 (West 2019) (providing relief to a victim of a
single sexual assault).
330
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950a (2018).
331
MINN. STAT. § 609.748 (2019) (requiring only proof of “a single act of physical or
sexual assault”); Emery v. Bryand, No. A13-1146, 2013 Minn. App. LEXIS 1172 (Minn. Ct.
App. Dec. 30, 2013) (finding that the district court did not err when it granted a restraining
order even though failing to find an immediate and present danger of future harassment).
332
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-102 (2019) (requiring petition that “the petitioner is in
reasonable apprehension of bodily injury by the petitioner’s partner or family member”).
333
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.378 (2017) (requiring only proof that the “crime of sexual
assault has been committed against” the petitioner).
334
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50C-5 (2018) (providing relief “[u]pon a finding that the victim
has suffered unlawful conduct committed by the respondent”).
335
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01 (2019) (authorizing a restraining order if “the court
finds after the hearing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has
engaged in disorderly conduct,” including illegal sexual assault).
336
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (West 2019) (requiring only proof that the
respondent is over 18 and has “committed a sexually oriented offense”).
337
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.2 (2019) (offering relief for any adjudicated victim of
domestic abuse, stalking, harassment, or rape.).
338
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.763 (West 2019) (requiring petitioner to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that “the respondent subjected the petitioner to sexual abuse
within the 180 days preceding the filing of the petition” and that “[t]he petitioner reasonably
fears for the petitioner’s physical safety with respect to the respondent”).
339
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 62A06 (2018) (requiring proof that “the plaintiff or another
individual, as appropriate, is a victim of sexual violence or intimidation committed by the
respondent,” and “prove by preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff, or another
individual, as appropriate, is at a continued risk of harm from the defendant”).
340
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19A-8 (2019) (requiring only that the petitioner is the
victim of “(a) stalking or (b) physical injury as a result of an assault or (c) a crime of violence”
as defined in the criminal code, including rape and sexual assault).
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Tennessee341
Texas342

No
No

No
No

Vermont343
Virginia344
Washington345
Wisconsin346

No
No
No
No

Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Wyoming347

No

Yes

341

Preponderance
Preponderance
Preponderance
(must have
“substantial
fear”)
Clear and
Convincing
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Preponderance
Reasonable
Grounds
Preponderance
Preponderance
Preponderance
Preponderance

Clear and
Convincing

TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601 (West 2019) (requiring only proof that the petitioner
was “subjected to, threatened with, or placed in fear of” sexual assault).
342
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 7A.03 (West 2019) (requiring only proof that “there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant is the victim of sexual assault or abuse,
stalking, or trafficking” to issue a permanent restraining order); cf. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. § 7A.01 (West 2018) (requiring an application for a protective order to allege “that
there is a clear and present danger of sexual assault or abuse” to enter a temporary ex parte
order).
343
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 5133 (West 2019) (requiring proof “by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant has stalked or sexually assaulted the plaintiff”).
344
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-152.10 (2018) (authorizing relief upon a finding that the
respondent has been convicted of or threatened “an act of violence, force, or threat”).
345
WASH. REV. CODE § 7.90.020 (2019) (requiring proof of a non-consensual sexual
conduct or non-consensual sexual penetration); see also Roake v. Delman, 408 P.3d 658,
659 (Wash. 2018) (finding that statute requiring allegation and proof of probable future
harm).
346
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.125 (West 2019) (authorizing relief if the court finds
“reasonable grounds” to believe the respondent has engaged in harassment with intent to
harass or intimidate the petitioner, but requiring proof that there is a “substantial risk” of
future sexual assault to extend protective order).
347
WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 7-3-508(b) (2019) (“If the court determines . . . that there exists
a clear and present danger of further stalking, sexual assault or of serious physical adverse
consequences to any person, the court may grant ex parte a temporary order of protection
pending the hearing.”).

